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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1983 Ohio enacted a landmark public employee collective bargaining statute
amid great heat and controversy.' The heat of the new law's creation resulted in the
strongest administrative structure in the history of Ohio public administration, the
new State Employment Relations Board.
Public employee collective bargaining is a well-established fixture in the great
majority of states.2 Proponents of the Ohio legislation testified that only those states
with a history of anti-union animus had held firm against statutory recognition of
public employee labor relations. Among the heavily industrialized, heavily unionized
states, Ohio was exceptional in its political opposition to the cause of public sector
bargaining. As a result of union efforts between 1963 and 19833 there emerged the
strongest public sector employee statute in the nation,4 and, to administer it, the
strongest of the state labor relations agencies.
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1. 1983 Ohio Laws 140 (to be codified at Onto REv. CODE ch. 4117). The full text of the statute appears at 1983
Oto LEGis. Buu.. 1119-47 (Anderson) and at 1983 OHto LEGts. SERv. 5-237 to -246 (Baldwin). Because the statute
has not yet been printed in the supplement to either annotated Code, citations to individual sections of the new law will be
given thus: OHto REV. CODE § 4117.--. To achieve consistency with other sections of the Revised Code the new statute
also amended §§ 124.02, .03, .05, and .08.
2. Thirty-nine states adopted public sector labor relations legisiation before Ohio. Testimony of James Monroe,
Counsel to the Ohio Civil Service Employees Association Before the House Commerce and Labor Committee, June 14,
1983 Ihereinafter cited as Monroe Testimony]. The details of public employee collective bargaining statutes vary greatly
from state to state. For an overview, see I PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. (P-H) C 5146.
3. "Ohio, with its long history of essentially harmonious labor relations, and a decidedly pro-union atmosphere,
certainly does not belong in the same class with these other states, with their tradition of worker repression, low wages and
generally regressive economic climates." Monroe Testimony, supra note 2.
4. The efforts were led by the Ohio AFL-CIO, the Communications Workers of America, the Ohio Civil Service
Employees Association, the Ohio Education Association, the American Federation of State County & Municipal Em-
ployees, and the Ohio Federation of Teachers.
5. Ohio's State Employment Relations Board has greater powers than comparable agencies in any other state
because it combines so many adjudicative levels and so much administrative authority in one three-member body.
Compare Onto REv. CODE § 4117.02 with CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3500-3525 (West 1980); MitC. Comp. LAws ANN.
§§ 423.3-.5 (West 1978); and 43 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101.501-.503 (Purdon Supp. 1965-1982).
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The Ohio Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act (the "Act") has three
major aspects-politics, economics, and administrative law. A major state political
development, it generated great controversy, and its pendency influenced, and was
influenced by, state elections in 1982.6 It is an expensive but perhaps cost-effective
piece of legislation, acting countercyclically to expand government at a time when
costs and agency budgets are being drastically reduced as the state's tax base de-
clines. 7 Finally, the Act is a new, improved model of legislation for the administra-
tive resolution of labor issues that, in other states, have produced many years of
litigation and controversy.
This Article will focus on the administration of the Act by the new State Em-
ployment Relations Board (SERB). For purposes of comparison, the collective
bargaining statutes of four populous states-Pennsylvania, 8 Michigan, 9 New York'0
and California' 1-will be examined. The other states' experiences and their case law
will be used to fill in the interstices of the comprehensive Ohio statute. Further, this
Article will examine the system by which the SERB's powers will be exercised.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Ohio courts have been hostile to public employee unionization for years.
The strong condemnation of employee organization efforts in the 1947 Ohio Supreme
Court decision Hagerman v. City of Dayton12 stood as the state's key precedent for
three decades. In the same year the legislature adopted the same attitude of strong
opposition to adversarial labor relations by passing the Ferguson Act.13
The Hagerman decision invalidated the city of Dayton's checkoff of union dues
for a city employee labor organization. 14 The court spoke in strident terms against
public sector collective bargaining, stating that unions "have no function which they
may discharge in connection with civil service appointees" and that the employer city
could not delegate any of its functions to such an organization.' 5 The delegation
theory was applied strictly by the lower courts to proscribe the union security clauses
that public sector unions traditionally have sought. 16
6. Ohio elected a Democratic governor, Senate, and House of Representatives.
7. Ohio, as many other midwestern states, experienced significant funding problems and tax increases in the 1983
budget period, concurrent with debate on the new bill. See, e.g., Celeste to Unveil Tax Relief Package Tuesday; Budget
Proposal Due Wednesday, 56 Gongwer Ohio Report, March 28, 1983, at 1; and State of Ohio, Executive Budget for the
Biennium (July 1, 1983 to June 30, 1985), at 5.01.04 (1983).
8. 43 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101.201-.503 (Purdon Supp. 1965-1982).
9. MtCH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.1-.247 (West 1978 & Supp. 1983-1984).
10. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW §§ 200-214 (MeKinney 1983).
11. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3500-3525 (vest 1980).
12. 147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E.2d 246 (1947).
13. 1947 Ohio Laws 122 (repealed 1983, but still codified at OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-.05 (Page 1980)).
The Ferguson Act is discussed in several articles, including Hoffman & Newman, Public Employee Strikes in Ohio: The
Ferguson Act Reconsidered, 5 AKRON L. REv. 203 (1972); Note, Ohio Public Sector Labor Relations Law. A Time for
Reevaluation and Reform, 42 U. CIN. L. Rev. 679 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note: Ohio Public Sector Labor Relations
Law]; and Case Note, Labor Law-Collective Bargaining and Grievance Arbitration in Ohio Public Education, 37 OHIO
ST. L.J. 670 (1976).
14. 147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E.2d 246 (1947). The city by contract had agreed to the dues checkoff; members
executed a note payable to the union that would be repaid by the employer deductions. Id. at 314.
15. Id. at 328-29, 71 N.E.2d at 254.
16. Foltz v. City of Dayton, 27 Ohio App. 2d 35, 272 N.E.2d 169 (1970).
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The Ferguson Act prohibited public employee strikes.' 7 Employees who went
on strike were not to be protected from disciplinary action, and they could be fined
for participation in a strike. 18 The Act provided, for purposes of due process, that an
employee engaged in a work stoppage was not on strike until the employer notified
the individual that he or she was considered to be on strike; after that point, penalty
provisions would apply. ' 9 This notice provision allowed employers to withhold puni-
tive action as a means of settling strikes before the incident was legally designated as
a prohibited strike.20
Since the single most potent weapon of employees in the collective bargaining
situation is the strike, 21 it was very difficult for Ohio's public sector unions to
accomplish effective bargaining with public employers in the absence of a legal right
to strike. The first effort toward legislative change, begun by the Ohio Education
Association in the early 1960s, 22 accomplished a small statutory change-public
employers were permitted to check off dues. 23 In turn, this change led to the evolu-
tion of a common-law right to collective bargaining, 24 but without the union security
clause of an agency shop.2 5
The first draft of comprehensive Ohio public sector labor relations legislation
was prepared in 1971, and the first progress with that bill was made in 1973 under
Democratic Governor John Gilligan. 26 The 1973 effort never emerged from the
Republican controlled Senate Commerce and Labor Committee, 27 but by 1975 pros-
pects were improving, on both the political and judicial fronts.
In 1975 the Ohio Supreme Court, deviating from the Hagerman precedent, ruled
in Dayton Classroom Teachers Association v. Dayton Board of Education21 that a
school district has inherent discretionary authority to enter into collective bargaining
agreements with unions.29 The court did not address or attempt to reconcile the
Hagerman precedent.30 In the following year, however, limits were placed upon
judicially sanctioned collective bargaining when the same court rejected collective
bargaining for lower court employees and asserted that only certain public bodies had
17. 1947 Ohio Laws 122 (repealed 1983).
18. OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05 (Page 1980), repealed by 1983 Ohio Laws 140.
19. Id. § 4117.04, repealed by 1983 Ohio Laws 140.
20. See Note, Ohio Public Sector Labor Relations Law, supra note 13.
21. "[Collective bargaining, true joint determination, cannot exist without the prospect of a strike." Kheel, The
Taylor Law: A Critical Examination of Its Virtues and Defects, Developments in New York Law, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV.
181, 188 (1968). The Ohio Federation of Teachers informed the legislature that the right to strike was a "must" for "true
collective bargaining." Ohio Federation of Teachers, Legislative Policy Statement (Mar. 5, 1983).
22. Interview with Dennis Morgan, Counsel to Communications Workers Union, June 6, 1983.
23. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41 (Page 1978). A "checkoff" is a device by which the employer collects dues for
the union automatically with each designated pay period.
24. Dayton Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Dayton Bd. of Edue., 41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 323 N.E.2d 714 (1975);
Youngstown Educ. Ass'n v. Youngstown City Rd. of Educ., 36 Ohio App. 2d 35, 301 N.E.2d 891 (1973); Foltz v. City
of Dayton, 27 Ohio App. 2d 35, 272 N.E.2d 169 (1970).
25. An agency shop is defined as a contractual arrangement whereby employees must eitherjoin the union or pay the
union a service fee equivalent to periodic union dues. R. SMITH, H. EDWARDS & R. CLARK, JR., LABOR RELATIONS LAW
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 596 (1974). See OHIO REv. CODE § 4117.09(C).
26. Interview with Dennis Morgan, Counsel to Communications workers Union, June 6, 1983.
27. Id.
28. 41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 323 N.E.2d 714 (1975).
29. Id. at 132, 323 N.E.2d at 717.
30. Dayton Teachers did not even refer to Hagerman.
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the power to contract with their employees. 3' The court held that the power to enter
into collective bargaining was created by statute alone and was not inherent in any
particular employer.
32
Ohio's first comprehensive public employee bill passed both houses of the state
legislature in 1975 after extensive lobbying for it and a number of compromises. 33
Republican Governor James Rhodes vetoed the bill, and an attempt to override the
veto failed. 34 The provisions of the 1975 bill were taken from a number of sources,
principally the 1970 Pennsylvania labor relations legislation. 35 A modified, but still
comprehensive, text was introduced in the 1977 legislature, and it also was passed
and vetoed. An attempt to override this second veto also failed.36 The fact that Ohio
law prohibited strikes and that collective bargaining was weak did not prevent strife
on the public labor front during the 1970s. Federal statistics indicate that 428 public
employee work stoppages occurred in Ohio from 1973 through 1980. 37
The legislature's composition changed significantly after the 1982 elections,
with the advent of a Democratic majority in both houses.3 8 Critics of the labor
movement were very quick to point out the huge campaign contributions that had
been made to the Democratic candidate for governor. Proponents of the legislation
retorted that the governor, an advocate of public sector bargaining legislation, sub-
scribed to the 1977 legislation well before the electoral campaigns. It was alleged that
the reelection efforts of principal legislative figures, who later became involved with
the effort to pass a public sector collective bargaining statute, had been helped by
labor; but it also was argued that the bill's proponents in the legislature had supported
collective bargaining legislation long before 1983. 39
The collective bargaining bill passed in relatively rapid time because much of
the debate had been heard in prior legislative sessions.40 The bill, S. 133, was
introduced in the Ohio Senate on March 17, 1983, passed the Senate Commerce and
Labor Committee on April 19, and passed the Senate by a seventeen to sixteen vote
on April 21. It was reported from the House Commerce and Labor Committee on
June 21, passed by the House on June 30, cleared by the Senate as amended on June
31. Malone v. Court of Common Pleas, 45 Ohio St. 2d 245, 344 N.E.2d 126 (1976).
32. Id. at 248, 344 N.E.2d at 129.
33. Note, Collective Bargaining in Ohio's Public Sector: The Blueprint of Senate Bill 222 for Constructive Labor
Relations, 7 CAP. U.L. Rrv. 295 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Collective Bargaining].
34. Id. at 298.
35. Interview with Dennis Morgan, Counsel to Communications Workers Union, June 6, 1983. The Pennsylvania
statute is found at 43 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. ch. 19 (Purdon Supp. 1965-1982).
36. Interview with Stewart Jaffy, General Counsel, Ohio AFL-CIO, June 13, 1983.
37. Monroe Testimony, supra note 2. By contrast, the number of strikes during the same period in Maine was eight.
and in Washington, 90. Id. When the sponsor, Senator Eugene Branstool, introduced the bill, his statistics indicated that
there had been 434 strikes in Ohio in the period from 1971 to 1981. Press Release of Senator Eugene Branstool on
Introduction of S.B. 133 (Mar. 18, 1983).
38. The Democratic majority in the Senate was 17 to 16, and the bill passed by that margin. Bargaining Bill for
Public Employees Approved by Senate, 56 Gongwer Ohio Report, Apr. 21, 1983, at 1.
39. Jordan, Labor's Investment Reaps Dividends, Columbus Dispatch, May 1, 1983, at F4. Jordan asserts that
Governor Celeste received more than $1,000,000 in campaign contributions from unions and that primary sponsor
Branstool received campaign contributions of $43,000. The Jordan article was circulated by the bill's opponents, the Ohio
Information Committee. Id. All labor proponents interviewed strongly disagreed, noting that support for the bill carried
over from 1977 and could not have been purchased, and that contributions for allies had no role in the adoption of the bill.
40. A total of 152 changes were made, but most were relatively minor wording concessions. Interview with Stewart
Jaffy, General Counsel, Ohio AFL-CIO, Aug. 4, 1983.
[Vol. 44:891
19831 OHIO PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 895
30, and signed by the Governor July 6, 1983. 4" Though the final bill was fifty-seven
pages in length, it is likely that most of its provisions were well known to the
legislators because of the history of controversy that brought the bill to the top of the
legislative agenda.
III. STRUCTURE OF THE NEW LAW
Ohio's new collective bargaining law for public employees constitutes a com-
prehensive blanket of coverage for public sector workers. Each of the disparate pieces
of the Act evolved concurrently during the decade preceding adoption, and they will
be construed together by the courts.42 This overview will be followed by a discussion
of the new administrative agency and its multiple roles. Portions of the Act relating to
each of the roles will be discussed in greater detail later in this Article.
Every employee representative organization in Ohio will be given rights and
responsibilities. The labor organization must register and provide periodic reports to
the state.4 3 Employee organizations that already have collective bargaining agree-
ments with public employers are covered by "grandfather" provisions that favor the
existing representatives.' 4 Public employees who are not now represented are likely
to have many competing solicitations for representation by those organizations
already involved in the representation of public employees and those who seek to
expand their union's membership .
45
The new law provides that bargaining unit determinations will be made by the
SERB. 46 Thereafter, the SERB will certify representative organizations for bargain-
ing. Certification occurs either by election47 or by direct request when more than fifty
percent of employees have signed for membership. 48 As the bargaining progresses,
the SERB will police the fairness of bargaining and will enforce the mandatory
contents of the agreement. 49 For example, the SERB will assure that the method of
grievance resolution is stated in the contract. 50 If the employee unit is comprised of
fire fighters, police, guards, or other designated special purpose employees, the
agreement will include provisions on binding arbitration, which will require a "con-
ciliator" to select from the final offers of the disputing parties on an issue-by-issue
basis. 5'
41. Because Ohio lacks legislative history chronicles, the progress of the bill was reported most closely in a
newsletter, the Gongwer Ohio Report, which detailed each stage of its consideration between March and July of 1983.56
Gongwer Ohio Report, Nos. 53-124 (1983).
42. This is especially so since the legislation is remedial in nature. 3 C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONsrisucroN § 60.02 (4th ed. 1974).
43. Otno REV. CODE § 4117.19.
44. 1983 Ohio Laws 140, § 4.
45. Andry, Unions Covet Public Employees, Cincinnati Post, June 1, 1983, at 8B.
46. Onto REV. CODE § 4117.06(A).
47. Id. § 4117.04. Compare 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.602(a) (Purdon Supp. 1965-1982), which permits a
joint employer-employee request for certification.
48. Omo REV. CODE § 4117.05(A).
49. The primary enforcement tool is unfair labor practices enforcement. Id. § 4117.11. Mandatory terms of the
bargain include grievance resolution procedures, id. § 4117.09, which was protested during deliberations. Testimony of
Frank Stewart Before Senate Commerce and Labor Committee, Apr. 6, 1983.
50. Otto REV. CODE § 4117.09(B)(1).
51. Id. § 4117.14(D),(G).
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The right to strike is granted to public employees, 52 except those with a special
safety purpose, and the SERB is able to limit unlawful strikes through its power to
control access to the courts of equity. 53 Although the SERB has the authority to adopt
regulations, 54 most of its work likely will be done by adjudication of unit de-
terminations, jurisdictional disputes, and unfair labor practice complaints.55
Ohio consciously chose not to follow the federal model for its central labor
authority. The National Labor Relations Board has five members. 56 An independent
official, the NLRB General Counsel, issues the complaints of unfair labor practices,
which the Board members adjudicate. 57 A separate federal entity, the Federal Media-
tion and Conciliation Service, provides mediators to aid with settlement of significant
disputes. 58 And a third agency, the Department of Labor, conducts studies and
training in labor relations areas. 59 The federal Merit Systems Protection Board ad-
judicates special civil service employee appeals. 60 Ohio combines all of these func-
tions in the SERB. 6
1
The SERB has three members, selected for staggered six-year terms. 62 Experi-
ence in personnel or labor relations is required of the members, and no more than two
may be of the same political party. 6 3 Although there were originally to have been five
members, the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee adopted a three-member
amendment in April 1983 in response to arguments that budgets would be smaller and
meetings easier with two fewer members. 6' Critics of the political test for member
selection had argued that designation should be based on management or union
affiliation, for a Board heavily favoring labor or employers could result too easily if
political affiliation were the only test. The Act's sponsors, citing difficulties with
requiring management or union affiliation, disagreed and prevailed.6 5
The SERB acts as initial investigator, adjudicator, decision maker, registrar of
unions, supervisor of civil service appeal actions, and appointer of participants in
mediation. At the request of the Attorney General, a late amendment made him the
legal representative of the SERB in Ohio courts. 6 6 That modification is significant
52. Id. § 4117.14(D)(2).
53. Id. § 4117.16(A).
54. Id. § 4117.02(H)(8).
55. See id. § 4117.14.
56. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1976).
57. Id. § 153(d); see also E. MILLER, AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPRAISAL OF THE NLRB (1977).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 172 (1976).
59. Id. § 9.
60. 5 U.S.C. § 7702 (1982).
61. Omo REV. CODE § 4117.02.
62. Id. § 4117.02(A).
63. Id.
64. Interview with Dennis Morgan, Counsel to Communications Workers Union, June 6, 1983.
65. Opponents felt a distribution by representative group would be best. Interview with John F. Lewis, June 14,
1983 [hereinafter cited as Lewis interview]. Proponents disagreed since the Board was to be a body representative of the
public, and not exclusively of constituents. Interview with Stewart Jaffy, General Counsel, Ohio AFL-CIO, Aug. 4,
1983. Due process concerns were raised over the possibility that adjudicative decisions might be prejudged by a Board
member who has previously formed opinions regarding the parties' positions. A division based on union or management
affiliation was ruled invalid in a comparable Arizona statute, and the case is now pending before the Ninth Circuit en bane.
See United Farm workers v. Agricultural Employment Relations Bd., 696 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1983) (opinion in the
Federal Reporter was withdrawn from the bound volumes when the case was taken en bane).
66. OHIO REv. CODE § 4117.02(E).
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because it brings the SERB into parallel with the state Civil Rights and Public
Utilities Commissions in terms of Attorney General representation. 67 With this single
exception, the Board controls all aspects of public labor relations.
Because they considered centrally administered expertise essential to the
functioning of public sector collective bargaining, commentators have argued that no
bill should be passed unless it included an effective central agency. 68 But Ohio has a
diverse set of local needs and a great number of rural communities. Legislators
consciously created a central agency that will be forced to respond rapidly--one day
for appointment of fact-finding boards6 9 and seventy-two hours for ruling on legality
of strikes.70 There is express authority for "directors for local areas,"- 71 who will, as
a sheer function of decisional time, be delegated a great deal of discretion.
Other states offered different models. Pennsylvania's Public Employment Rela-
tions Board was the primary model used by the labor union advocates of an Ohio
bill. 7' New York allowed each area to develop its own system, provided that it met
state standards and was not in conflict with the state board's control.7 3 Michigan's
non-civil service employees are covered by a state board, from whose control the
state civil service employees are excluded by a constitutional provision. 74 Ohio has
eliminated its civil service board and subordinated its personnel review board to the
new SERB. 75 In spite of the potential delegation of authority to "directors for local
areas," the Ohio SERB has stronger central authority than any of these counterparts
in other states.
The three principal arguments made against the centralized authority of the
SERB were that it would ignore the local governmental authority's needs in resolving
labor troubles, 76 that it would cost an estimated three million dollars per year in direct
costs alone, 77 and that federal mediation services were available. 78 Advocates re-
67. All state agencies follow the Attorney General's formal advice; see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 109.12, .20 (Page
1978), and I Op. Arr'y GEN. 534 (1939). The Attorney General will not issue opinions on matters pending before an
adjudicative body of the state. Interview with Executive Assistant Attorney General John Biancamano, Aug. 24, 1983.
The first House committee amendment made the Attorney General the "legal adviser," but a later amendment gave the
Attorney General the duty of representing the Board in the courts. OHIO REv. CODE § 4117.02(E). After adoption, the
Attorney General took the position that representation of "agents" meant that he would represent the Board's position in
the hearings before the trial examiners and the Board once the agents had investigated and brought the charges. This
implicit power clarified an ambiguity in § 4117.02(E).
68. Note, Ohio Public Sector Labor Relations Law, supra note 13, at 697 n.84 (quoting W. Heisel, Considerations
in Preparation of Ohio Legislation for Public Employee Collective Bargaining (1972) (unpublished manuscript)).
69. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.14(C)(3).
70. Id. § 4117.23(A).
71. Id. § 4117.02(E).
72. 43 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. ch. 19 (Purdon Supp. 1965-1982) was adopted in 1970 and provided much of the
material for Sub. S.B. 70, 11 lth Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. (1975), the first public sector collective bargaining bill to pass
the Ohio legislature.
73. See N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw § 205 (MeKinney 1983), which specifies the powers and functions of the Board.
74. See MICH. Co.'ip. LAws ANN. § 423.3 (West 1978); MtCH. CONST. art. IV, § 48.
75. 1983 Ohio Laws 140, § 1.
76. Ohio PTA, Legislative Policy Statement (Mar. 2, 1983); Memo to the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee
from J. Coleman, Ohio Municipal League, Apr. 19, 1983.
77. Testimony of John Stewart, Ohio Information Committee, Before the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee,
Mar. 29, 1983.
78. Testimony of Ohio Ass'n of School Business Officials Before the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee,
Mar. 30, 1983.
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sponded that uniformity and balance would save the disruption costs of strikes,79 that
costs had been overestimated,8" and that voluntary mediation would require mutual-
ity, which had been missing under the existing system. 8 1 As an accommodation, the
federal mediation system was inserted by reference in the state bill, to be used as an
alternative; 82 and the bill was amended to create a separate office of mediation within
the SERB to afford some segregation of responsibility, upholding the ostensible
neutrality of the SERB mediators. 83 No serious consideration was given to a system
of decentralized authorities, like those in New York, in which regional bodies meet
state norms but have autonomy.
84
IV. THE NEW AGENCY WITHIN THE STATE STRUCTURE
A. Its Formation and Powers
Accompanying the creation of the SERB was the establishment of a new agency
within the Department of Administrative Services. This new Office of Collective
Bargaining, first included in the 1977 bill85 and expanded in 1983,86 performs central
negotiation functions for the entire state government. Other public employers have
the right to select freely their own representatives,8 7 but the Office, by law, must
represent each state agency.88 While the creation of the SERB was a predictable part
of all the proposed collective bargaining bills, it is striking that a bill that was drafted
principally by labor unions designed so precisely the structure of labor's chief
bargaining opponent. Centralization of bargaining tends to strengthen the employer's
position as an adversary.
8 9
Skeptics might observe that because governors are directly elected, immediate
control of the state negotiators within a Cabinet department by a politician who faces
periodic reelection is likely to make the bargaining posture of the employer repre-
sentatives somewhat more flexible during election years. 90 A state hospital whose
superintendent drove a hard bargain in 1981 may have won concessions greater than
the governor's staff members will demand at the same site during the electoral
campaign of 1986. Arguably, the governor of a large, economically depressed state is
likely to remain unaware of this additional new responsibility, unless and until an
79. Monroe Testimony, supra note 2.
80. Id.; Interview with Stewart Jaffy, General Counsel, Ohio AFL-CIO, June 13, 1983.
81. Monroe Testimony, supra note 2.
82. OHto REv. CODE § 4117.02(E).
83. Id. § 4117,02(H)(1).
84. See, e.g., Kheel, supra note 21; McHugh, New York's Experiment in Public Employee Relations: The Public
Employees' Fair Emplovment Act, 32 ALB. L. REv. 58 (1967).
85. The 1977 bill, Sub. S.1B. 222, 112th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess., is described in Note, Collective Bargaining, supra
note 33.
86. OHIO REv. CODE § 4117.10(D).
87. Id. However, this section provides that the Office is not required to represent colleges or statewide elected
officials.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., the position of Pennsylvania's office on strikes in Decker, The Right to Strike for Penns'lvania's
Public Employees-Its Scope, Limits, and Ranifications for the Public Employer, 17 DuQ. L. REv. 755 (1978-1979).
90. Ohio's governor has a four year term. Onto CoNs-r. art. III, § 2.
[Vol. 44:891
1983] OHIO PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 899
adversary challenges him to change the cabinet office's policies or personnel. A
measure of the influences upon the office may be its authority regarding multiunit
bargaining, which is permissive and may favor the larger statewide unions.
9 1
Proponents of the Office will argue that a governor who must keep the state
budget balanced cannot lose control of the huge labor cost item in his budget. No
governor can buy labor peace in all comers of the state, and in an era of income
deficits, no governor could afford great economic concessions to some or all
unions. 92
Administratively, this preemptive control agency will be much more than a
policy coordination body. There is no method under state law for a state board or
agency to compel the new office to change its position on an issue or a concession.
93
The central office will bargain on behalf of numerous state agencies. If com-
munications between this office and its clients are not handled well, internecine
warfare, outstripping the conflicts between the state and its unions, may break out
within the ranks of management.
Interaction between the Board and the Attorney General will also be crucial.
Because the Attorney General is to represent the SERB in court94 and serve as its
legal adviser,95 problems may arise if the views of the SERB and the Attorney
General on legal issues begin to diverge. The Attorney General personally asked for
the power, and his staff feels strongly that no conflicts will develop. Nonetheless, the
structural cohesion of this arrangement will depend on mutual attachments and
cooperation. 9
6
The SERB can issue adjudicative opinions and educational materials; the Attor-
ney General acts as counsel in their drafting. The Attorney General issues opinions,
which normally bind state agencies and which usually avoid fields of current ad-
judicative activity. If the two sources of interpretation disagree, the Attorney Gener-
al's Office expects that the courts will hear a unified state position, or that a special
counsel may be appointed in exceptional cases.
97
At any one time, politics can shift alliances. For example, a governor and a two
to one SERB majority of one party may take one position on a question of major
interpretative significance to public employers, while an Attorney General and an
91. See Oitto REv. CODE § 4117.06(D).
92. For example, the Ohio human services budget, a largely personnel related cost item, increased from
84,020,600.000 in 1980-81 to S7,190,200,000 in 1984-85. State of Ohio, Executive Budget for the Biennium (July 1,
1983 to June 30, 1985), at 5.01.04 (1983).
93. See OHto REv. CODE § 4117. 10(D).
94. Id. § 4117.02(E).
95. This resulted from a two-stage committee amendment. The role of legal adviser came first; then, at the request of
the Attorney General, authority was given to allow his office to represent the Board in all proceedings. Since court and
administrative proceedings were not distinguished, the Attorney General has adopted the view that the prosecution of
administrative cases was his office's duty. Once the agents investigate the cases, the Attorney General prosecutes the
charge before the trial examiner and then before the Board. If a conflict occurs, the Attorney General will almost always
defer to the SERB's decision, in rare cases a special counsel may be appointed. Interview with Executive Assistant
Attorney General John Biancamano, Aug. 4, 1983.
96. See Oito REv. CODE § 4117.02.
97. Oto Rsv. CODE ANN. § 109.12 (Page 1978). The Attorney General does not, as a policy matter, issue an
opinion on a matter that is likely to be in adjudication, such as an issue pending before the SERB. Interview with
Executive Assistant Attorney General John Biancamano, Aug. 4, 1983.
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SERB minority of the other party hold the opposite view. The statutory duty to be
legal adviser implies that the Attorney General will represent the client's position.
But loyalty to the client will override neither the primary constitutional duties nor the
individual sensitivity to the need for reelection.9" The potential for tension in powers
of legal interpretation is thus built into the law. Ultimately, the legislature may wish
to reconsider the shift of authority and add an independent legal staff to the SERB.
The United States Supreme Court has infrequently invoked the doctrine that
excessive delegation to an administrative agency is unconstitutional.99 However,
each new agency can be scrutinized to determine if the legislative body has ade-
quately set forth standards within which the agency's exercise of discretion will be
canalized.100 The powers of the SERB appear to be adequately canalized."01 The
SERB powers were given with accompanying criteria and are for the most part
reviewable by a court under a substantial evidence test.' 0 2 Enough criteria exist to
guide the SERB, the fact finders, and the conciliators, whose powers all flow from
the new law. 10
3
One very controversial delegation, the power of the SERB to select appropriate
bargaining units,' 0 4 has been criticized as a nonreviewable area, subject to abuse and
likely to give rise to future disputes.'0 5 Because SERB decisions concerning units
cannot be judicially reviewed, except perhaps through mandamus proceedings, em-
ployers may find a multiplicity of units involved in a decision that affects a single
school or state garage. Unit determinations are a significant source of controversy in
the private sector since elections can be affected by inclusion or exclusion of workers
from a particular unit.10 6 Legislative trade-off of voting support apparently occurred
with faculty unions, 10 7 craft unions, 10 8 and teachers;' 0 9 future amendments to over-
ride unpopular SERB unit decisions can be anticipated as well.
Other states permit review of unit determinations, but accord them great defer-
ence." 0 Ohio's failure to create a statutory right of review delegates authority ex-
clusively to the SERB. 111 Proponents noted that the criteria were adequately set out in
98. The Attorney General is a constitutional officer, OHIO CONST. art. 111, § 1. No conflicts in opinions have arisen
in public utility and civil rights cases handled by the Attorney General. Interview with Executive Assistant Attorney
General John Biancamano, Aug. 4, 1983.
99. See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388 (1935).
100. See B. SCHWARTz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 11-14, at 34-39 (1976).
101. Limitations on SERB discretion and the specification of legislated policy choices save the Ohio Act from the
Schechter standard. Arguments alleging the excessive delegation of authority to labor agencies rarely succeed; see, e.g.,
City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 408 Mich. 410, 294 N.W.2d 68, appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 903 (1981).
102. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.13(B).
103. Criteria for conciliators are found at id. § 4117.14(G)(7).
104. Id. § 4117.06(A).
105. Interview with Frank Stewart, Ohio Information Committee, June 1983.
106. For example, a union may win an election among 80 production workers, but the inclusion of 20 office workers
in the unit can sway the outcome of the election in the employer's favor.
107. See OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.01(C)(14), .06(D)(4).
108. 1983 Ohio Laws 140, § 4.
109. See OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.01(F)(4).
110. Hospital Employees' Div. of Local 79 v. Flint Osteopathic Hosp., 390 Mich. 635, 212 N.W.2d 897 (1973); In
re Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Helsby, 25 N.Y.2d 842, 250 N.E.2d 731, 303 N.Y.S.2d 690 (1969); Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Bd. v. Venango/Clarion Medical Health Center, Inc., 52 Pa. Commw. 341, 415 A.2d 1259 (1980).
111. Although statutory review is barred, a mandamus action can still be brought. See Otto REV. CODE
§ 4117.06(A).
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the statute,112 while a critic observed that mere "lip service" could be paid to the
criteria while the Board adopted whichever units served its unarticulated purposes. 113
The delegation in the Ohio law is much more detailed than that in the provisions
of comparable states like Pennsylvania. 1 4 A proponent explained that it was "better
to have certain things nailed down." 115 Unfriendly SERB members cannot alter
definitions of "management employees," 1 6 for example, as the changed composi-
tion of the NLRB has changed statutory interpretations within federal labor relations
policy. 117 Strong delegations of power were accompanied by a tight leash. Legisla-
tive definitions will limit the courts and the agency in future cases."
8
Opponents of the legislation were critical of the precise definitions chosen.
There are still ambiguities on key issues, such as the binding aspect of an arbitrated
order. It was argued that any defining of terms must be done in context; critics
charged that the facts of a particular work situation control whether a supervisory title
means a person is a "supervisor."119
The new law is particularly subject to close analysis for the rationality of its
exempted categories because the Act purports to give broad powers over all workers.
Political bargaining cut out workers in smaller areas of the state and may have
produced results different from, and arguably less rational than, those definitions that
a contested adjudication would produce. However, legislation has never been subject
to a substantial evidence standard of required support. For example, mandatory
inclusion of fire-fighting officers other than the chief of a fire department' 20 within
the fire fighters' bargaining unit' 2 1 means that no fire employees will be available to
fight fires if their unions, active participants in drafting the legislation, should strike a
municipal employer.' 22 The rationality of the legislation's categories is presumed.
Advocates of the bill defend the definitions, asserting that the legislature codi-
fied the law at approximately the same place where litigation would have led it.
123
Because votes were taken on many different amendments, 2 4 directly elected repre-
112. Interview with Dennis Morgan, Counsel to Communications Workers Union, June 6, 1983.
113. Testimony of Frank Stewart Before the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee, Apr. 6, 1983. Mr. Stewart
noted the importance of judicial review of unit determinations, as illustrated by cases in which the NLRB contravened its
statutory authority and was overruled by the courts. See, e.g., NLRB v. Frederick Memorial Hosp., Inc., 691 F.2d 191
(4th Cir. 1982), and NLRB v. HMO Int'lICal. Medical Group Health Plan, Inc., 678 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1982).
114. Compare, e.g., certification provisions in 43 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. § 1101.602 (Purdon Supp. 1965-1982),
with Ohio's new process, OHto REV. CODE §§ 4117.05-.07.
115. Interview with Dennis Morgan, Counsel to Communications Workers Union, June 6, 1983.
116. Outo REV. CODE § 4117.01(K).
117. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
118. Definitions contained in Onto REV. CODE § 4117.01 intentionally limit the scope of authority of the agency,
making it significantly less able to vary from statutory terms. New York's approach is much looser see N.Y. Cir. SERV.
LAw § 201 (McKinney 1983).
119. Interview with Frank Stewart, Ohio Information Committee, June 1983.
120. Onto REv. CODE § 4117.01(F)(2) excludes fire and police lieutenants and captains from coverage except when
they are in a position that would allow them to act as a substitute for the chief. Cf. 43 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.
§ 1101.604(5) (Purdon Supp. 1965-1982).
121. Otto REV. CODE § 4117.01(F)(2).
122. Memo to Mayors and Managers Regarding Collective Bargaining Legislation from J. Coleman, Ohio Munici-
pal League, Mar. 24, 1983; Testimony of John Stewart, Ohio Information Committee, Before Senate Commerce and
Labor Committee, Mar. 29, 1983.
123. Interview with Dennis Morgan, Counsel to Communications Workers Union, June 6, 1983. For example, the
Act treats civil service eligibility lists as a nonbargainable matter. Onto REv. CODE § 4117.07(A)(1).
124. Dozens of amendments were offered, but few were adopted that were not offered by the bill's principal
sponsors. A news report about the lone Republican on the Senate subcommittee stated: "Senator Gaeth had about three
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sentatives made many of the decisions that in other states were left to unelected Board
members. Further, the pros and cons of the amendments were aired adequately, with
changes favoring each side.' 25 The net effect of legislated definitions is more predict-
able decision making by the administrative agency in future cases.
A final delegation of powers is to the arbitration official, the conciliator, for
whom standards exist but within whose power a great deal of authority to make policy
and financial decisions resides. 126 Time will tell what authority will be upheld against
future attacks.
B. Rulemaking, Adjudication, and the SERB
That the legislation creating the SERB is indisputably remedial of the problems
of public sector workers' 27 is demonstrated by the rulemaking and adjudicatory
powers conferred on the SERB.
The SERB has extensive power to issue procedural and substantive
regulations. 128 At the federal level the National Labor Relations Board has similar
powers, 129 but it has chosen to adopt few rules and to operate mostly by adjudicative
precedents. 130 The Supreme Court has upheld that reluctance.' 3 1 The SERB has
express rulemaking power, and in some cases it must establish rules that will define
the procedures for certain actions by mediators, parties, and others.' 32
The SERB can choose to define substantive terms either by rulemaking or by
adjudication. Unlike many administrative bodies, the SERB's rulemaking power is
tied to formal hearings. 33 Participation in rulemaking is to be guaranteed through
dozen amendments but offered only 15, observing that the Bill appears to be 'pretty much etched in concrete' and not
subject to amendments that would permit some flexibility." Binding Arbiration Removed from Collective Bargaining Bill,
56 Gongwer Ohio Report, Apr. 11, 1983, at 2.
125. Some amendments took note of management pleas that smaller cities and townships be excluded from the
coverage of the new law. See Osto REv. CODE § 4117.01(B). A 2,000 population limit on the Act's coverage was the
only amendment accepted on the Senate floor during a three-hour debate. See Bargaining Bill for Public Employees
Approved by Senate, 56 Gongwer Ohio Report, Apr. 21, 1983, at 1. A House floor amendment then increased the
threshold to 5,000. OHto REV. CODE § 4117.01(B). This Code section will limit the local application of the bill to 266 of
the 939 incorporated areas in Ohio that have 5,000 or more residents. The 670 areas excluded may still bargain if they
choose to do so, but the Act does not so mandate. See id. § 4117.03(C). (The statistics referenced in subsection
4117.01(B) are census figures, and the 266 figure will be operative for 1980-1990. See BUREAU or THE CENSUS, OHIO
CENSUS OF POPULATION-NUMBER OF INHAITANTs, at 37-38 (1982)). This exemption will not change until 1991-92
under § 4117.01(B) as worded. Labor supported amendments that tailored specific protective clauses to specific items,
such as the definition of the retirement clerks as "safety forces" exempt from strikes. See Ono REV. CODE
§ 4117.14(D)(1).
126. See Oto REV. CODE § 4117.14(G).
127. Remedial legislation, which corrects a problem for which the statutes had formerly provided no solution, is
likely to be read liberally by the courts to accomplish the broad purpose of the statute. 3 C. SANDS, supra note 42, at
§ 60.02. The legislature expressly demanded liberal construction of the new statute. Otto REV. CODE § 4117.22.
128. OHIo REV. CODE § 4117.02(H)(8).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1976).
130. The NLRB chooses to follow precedential adjudications rather than rules. R. GoR|AN, BAStc TEx-r ON LABOR
LAw 17-20 (1976).
131. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
132. See, e.g., Otto REV. CODE § 4117.14(C)(3)(e), (6).
133. See id. § 4117.02(H)(8). Most Ohio rules are issued in final form only after the agency has conducted a formal
hearing. Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 119.03(C) (Page 1978). By contrast, the great majority of federal rules are adopted
without hearings, by informal rulemaking, see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). See generally J. O'REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE
RULEMAKINo ch. 5 (1983).
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mailing lists for dissemination of notice of hearings.' 34 With the mailing list and a
fixed minimum time for advance notice,' 35 the SERB formal rulemaking system
should be protective of rights, yet rather cumbersome. On controversial issues, if the
federal experience with mandates for formal rulemaking is any indication, the SERB
is more likely to choose to adopt requirements by precedents. 136 Provided it avoids
creation of a prospective "rule" through nonrulemaking procedures, 137 the SERB's
rulemaking authority is likely to gain judicial deference.' 38
Adjudication comes naturally to an agency that has a decisional structure like the
SERB. Precedential development of labor law principles is likely to be the principal
means for defining SERB requirements. The SERB would be prudent to announce its
procedural requirements in the form of rules and its substantive decisions in adjudica-
tive precedents. 1
39
The likelihood that the SERB will prefer adjudication is underscored by the
availability of direct judicial review: the SERB is authorized to appeal, sua sponte, by
certifying its final order to the courts of appeals. 140 Until the legislation reached the
House in 1983, it provided for direct review by the Ohio Supreme Court of questions
of public interest certified to the court by the SERB.14 This novel approach to
administrative agency decisions will be discussed below. 142 But the final version of
the statute expressly gives the SERB standing to challenge its own decisions once
they become a "final order."'
143
The intent of this section was, at first, to insure prompt review of difficult policy
interpretations by the highest court in the state. The final bill deleted the advisory
role, however, and required a final order as a precondition to the SERB's self-
initiated appeals.'" Intriguing questions arise about whether an SERB that is un-
sympathetic to its enabling legislation could kill part of the law that created it. The
SERB could, for instance, take the statutory rule banning police sergeants from a
134. OHIo REv. CODE § 4117.02(H)(8)(a).
135. This time period is 30 days. Id. § 4117.02(H)(8)(a). It was 35 days in an earlier version of the same bill. The
Ohio Federation of Teachers asked for at least 60 days prior notice. Ohio Federation of Teachers, Legislative Policy
Statement (Mar. 5. 1983).
136. If the SERB chooses to follow the NLRB, it will make sense for the state agency to organize its policy decisions
so that they are issued in the adjudicative process. The benefit to the SERB would be not only greater precision, but also
increased flexibility because of the ability to change precedents.
137. In NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969), the Court held that a "rule" could be adopted by the
NLRB only by following the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act and could not be adopted through an
adjudication.
138. Deference to an administrative agency's adjudicatory opinions means that the reviewing court will accord great
weight to the policy aspects of the agency decision. Though courts can be deferential to adjudicatory decisions, those
which resemble rules gain less deference. See id.
139. The decision to issue a rule may be reserved for special cases, which will allow for predictability and provide
for direct notice by the Board to a wide group of persons. The NLRB's handling ofjurisdiction over universities illustrates
this point; see 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1983). Adjudication's gravest weakness is its inability to assert a coherent body of
comprehensive control through one document, as rulemaking can through the Federal Register. Adjudicative decisions are
available but not easily obtainable unless they are published by a commercial reporting service, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)
(1982).
140. OHio REV. CODE § 4117.02(L).
141. See § 4117.02(L) in S.B. 133, 115th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess., as introduced in the Senate (Mar. 18, 1983). A
basis for similar Supreme Court action has lain dormant for years. OHlo REv. CODE ANN. § 4141.28(N) (Page 1980).
142. See infra text accompanying notes 495-500.
143. OHto REv. CODE § 4117.02(L).
144. Interview with Stewart Jaffy, General Counsel, Ohio AFL-CIO, June 13, 1983.
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police officer bargaining unit 4 5 and refuse to follow it as an infringement on
sergeants' freedom of association.' 4 6 If the court of appeals were deferential and
agreed with the SERB, that portion of the bill would be defunct. The fact that
adjudications can be taken to the courts in this manner, but that rules cannot be,
indicates the legislative intent that significant policy work be done through
adjudication.' 47
A separate aspect of the scope of the new SERB's authority is that this change in
Ohio's labor policy is intentional and dramatic. With few exceptions, such as the
prepenalty notice to strikers,' 48 the Act departs significantly from Ohio precedent. 1
49
Courthouse patronage power is made vulnerable from within by exposing it to chal-
lenge by the appointed workers themselves. 5 0 Legislative exemptions designed to
save such dominions were partially successful, but political patronage may be fatally
fragmented by the changes in workers' rights.'
5
'
Opponents of the bill threatened that the change in scope of authority came too
suddenly. The public would be alarmed to find that arbitrators' awards were binding
on the taxing authority, it was asserted. 152 Newspapers were harshly, and almost
uniformly, critical of the bill's effects on the public sector's labor peace.' 53 Di-
ametrically contrary views from labor sent the message that, if Ohio had been figu-
145. OHto REv. CODE § 4117.06(D)(6).
146. That prohibition from membership has been tested in other states on various grounds. See, e.g., City of Des
Moines v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 264 N.W.2d 324 (Iowa 1978); Local 446, Professional Firefighters Ass'n
v. City of Aberdeen, 270 N.W.2d 139 (S.D. 1978); see also International Union of Police Ass'ns, Local 189 v. Barrett,
524 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
147. OHio REV. CODE § 4117.02(L) governs only final orders; the Board files with the court the record of the
adjudicatory proceeding, including the transcript. The outcome of the SERB decision in a contested case is an "adjudica-
tion" that produces a final order. Oto REv. CODE ANN. §§ 119.01(D), .06 (Page 1978). The definitions in chapter 119
apply in full to the SERB. See Oto REv. CODE § 4117.02(M).
148. The requirement that a striker be told that he or she is on strike was incorporated in the earlier law, Omo REv.
CODE ANN. § 4117.04 (Page 1980), repealed by 1983 Ohio Laws 140, and continued in the revised law, Onto REv. CODE
§ 4117.23(B)(1). The content of the notice differs in that the employer now gives the strikers notice that the SERB has
determined that the strike is not authorized. The use of the notice differs in that strikes will now, on many occasions, be
"authorized" and not subject to this notice provision.
149. Standing precedent is strongly contrary to the views embodied in the new Act. See, e.g., Hagerman v. City of
Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E.2d 246 (1947); see also Note, supra note 33.
150. The discharge of a patronage employee because of his or her union activities would be a prohibited unfair labor
practice that could result in both an injunction and an automatic certification of the union. See OHio REV. CODE
§§ 4117.11(A)(1), .12(A), .07(A)(2).
151. Late amendments to the bill excluded election employees and assistant prosecutors from the bill's coverage;
others, such as court employees and court clerks, who do not perform a judicial function, will be covered by the new law.
Id. § 4117.01(C)(8).
152. Binding arbitration was especially criticized by the Ohio Information Committee, a coalition group of op-
ponents of the bill. Testimony of John Stewart, Ohio Information Committee, Before the Senate Commerce and Labor
Committee, Mar. 29, 1983. The conciliator's selection between two competing offers during settlement, OHio REv. CODE
§ 4117.14(G), was considered more moderate than the bill's original final and binding arbitration provision. The
consensus to do away with final and binding arbitration, which would have allowed middle positions to be drafted by the
arbitrator alone, was so strong that the bill's sponsor, who chaired the subcommittee into whiCh the bill was introduced on
March 18, agreed with the amendment on April 11. Binding Arbitration Removed from Collective Bargaining Bill, 56
Gongwer Ohio Report, Apr. 11, 1983, at 2.
153. [The bill's progress can be viewed only as an example of the quintessential governmental arrogance
which holds that lawmakers must do what is "best" for the public in spite of the public. That must be it, for the
Democrats in the general assembly certainly have not paid a whit of attention to the many voices raised in
opposition .... The Statehouse should be buried in an avalanche of cards and letters protesting this crime
against the public interest.
Clerc, Papers Condemn Labor Bill, Cincinnati Enquirer, June 13, 1983, at A6.
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ratively at war before the law was passed, peace would break out. 154 The predictions
of those interviewed varied directly by their orientation, with management lawyers
expecting more litigation' 55 and labor lawyers expecting less.'
56
C. Certification and Election Powers
The decision of individual state and local employees to be represented by a
union is not a foregone conclusion, even with the strong policy favoring collective
bargaining embodied in the new Act. Each election offers "no representative," and
no employee can be compelled to join a union. 157
Ohio's new system appears to incline more toward unionization, however, than
before. Certainly, the established collective bargaining representatives are more fa-
vored as a matter of administrative procedure than new unions seeking to represent
already organized workers.' 5 8 Special arrangements, such as those for craft units, are
covered by special statutory exceptions. 59 Once a unit is defined by the SERB,' 6 °
the union's chances of election and later reelection are very strong.
The SERB's full control of the unit designation process is paralleled by its broad
power in representation and election proceedings, especially as compared to the
power conferred by other states. 161 Certification procedures' 62 appear to put a pre-
mium on timely action by a potential competitive union seeking to represent an
established unit. 163 The certification process is not difficult. At the organizational
stage, the union that is interested in representing nonunion employees must be able to
present to the employer evidence of representation of a simple majority of the work-
ers, fifty percent plus one. 16' SERB rules will define the quality of substantial
evidence needed, 16 5 which supersedes the former requirement of a showing of
154. Monroe Testimony, supra note 2.
155. Management lawyers interviewed for this article viewed the bill as likely to provoke extensive employer
objections and multitudes of interpretation difficulties for the courts. Their views were fully consistent with the testimony
of their clients and allied groups. More Strikes Predicted if Collective Bargaining Bill Passes, 56 Gongwer Ohio Report,
Apr. 18, 1983, at 2.
156. Labor lawyers interviewed for this article agreed that some litigation was inevitable but asserted that adminis-
trative remedies would detour the cases from courts into the administrative channels of the SERB with fewer cases actually
going to trial. Interviews with Dennis Morgan, Counsel to Communications Workers Union, June 6, 1983, and Stewart
Jaffy, General Counsel, Ohio AFL-CIO, June 13, 1983.
157. One's right not to be represented by a union is assured. OHIo REV. CODE § 4117.03(A)(1). The election process
must offer the opportunity to vote for "no representative," id. § 4117.07(C)(4), and since no person can be compelled to
join the union, even though it has become the person's exclusive representative through certification, union membership
remains voluntary. Id. § 4117.09(C).
158. The net impression formed from a study of the grandfather provisions in § 4 of the bill, and OHIo REv. CODE
§ 4117.07(B), is that the existing unions are much more likely to prevail in elections than are challengers.
159. Section 4(E) was added to the bill on the House floor. It establishes a special craft unit provision as an
exception to normal unit determination provisions. By doing so, it freezes a craft unit's current status.
160. OHIO REv. CODE § 4117.05(A)(2).
161. Most state labor relations boards and the NLRB get deference from the courts, but not the exclusivity of
unreviewable power. See, e.g., Hospital Employees' Div. of Local 79 v. Flint Osteopathic Hosp., 390 Mich. 635, 648,
212 N.W.2d 897, 903 (1973).
162. See OHIO REv. CODE §§ 4117.05, .06.
163. See id. § 4117.07(C)(6).
164. See id. § 4117.05(A)(2).
165. The standard is "substantial evidence based on, and in accordance with, rules prescribed by the Board." Id.
Compare Pennsylvania's standards, which appear to be more liberal. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.603 (Purdon
Supp. 1965-1982).
906 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:891
credible evidence. 166 By equating the standard for showing support and the standard
for review of SERB actions, the Act makes a clear definition of "substantial evi-
dence" important.
A copy of the union's certification request is sent to the SERB, and the time for
action begins with the date of filing with the employer. 167 The Act requires the public
employer to post a notice of the request and wait for opposition to union
certification. 168 On the twenty-second day after the union has filed for that unit's
certification, if no timely opposition has been filed and the employer fails to object,
the union is certified by the SERB.
16 9
In the event that the SERB finds that the employer engaged in unfair labor
practices that affect the union's former majority status and preclude a "free and
untrammeled" election, the SERB can certify the union without an election. 170 This
latter provision differs from the federal test and may provoke disputes if the SERB
broadly defines the effect of employer preelection conduct.171 An illustration may be
the initial effort to suppress organization of politically appointed workers. Interesting
questions of imputed authority will arise if a political leader who is not a "public
employer" makes threats to give the organizers' jobs to more faithful party members.
The prudent political party will need sophisticated legal advice before opposing the
union, lest it provoke an automatic certification as a penalty for misconduct.
Once a union is in place, the representative has at least one year and perhaps as
much as three years to operate.' 72 The SERB will administer the statutory program
affording a "window" of time within which challenges by other potential representa-
tives will be considered.173 The statute includes a contract bar to the recognition of
other exclusive representatives, but it is limited to contracts of three years or less. A
competing union can file a request for an election 120 days before the expiration of an
existing contract, but no later than ninety days before expiration. 174 The challenger
must claim that it now represents thirty percent of the workers or that the incumbent
union has lost its majority position. 175 Procedural rules will be set by the SERB for
the resultant contests and elections. 176 Litigation of ambiguities in comparable laws
in other states teaches that the period of time consumed by extensions of a contract
does not affect the timing of representation contests. 177
166. S.B. 222, ll2th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. (1977).
167. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.05(A)(2).
168. Id. § 4117.05(A)(2)(a).
169. Id. § 4117.05(A)(2).
170. Id. § 4117.07(A)(2).
171. If the employer's conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice and the union had the support of a majority of the
workers in the unit at one time, the SERB may certify the union without an election; but in order to do so the SERB must
find that a "free and untrammelled election cannot be conducted" as a result of the employer's practices. Because the
Ohio statute lacks a free speech proviso like that found in federal law, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976), many of the early Ohio
disputes are likely to concern employer statements against a particular union's request to represent the workers. By
contrast, the NLRB can certify without election only if there have been "outrageous" unfair labor practices. See, e.g.,
United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054 (3d Cir. 1980).
172. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.07(C).
173. Id.; cf. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 423.214 (Vest 1978) and 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.605(7)
(Purdon Supp. 1965-1982).
174. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.07(C)(6).
175. Id. § 4117.07(A)(I).
176. Id. § 4117.07(C)(1), (2). The rulemaking power is given to the SERB in § 4117.02(H)(8).
177. SERB's role is going to be delicate, and the allegiances of its initial three members will be watched closely.
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It would be prudent for the SERB to adopt painstaking neutrality in recognition
disputes and to adhere strictly to deadlines. The SERB will be born in an environment
of vigorous and healthy interunion competition. The newspapers have predicted
extensive infighting among Ohio unions. 7 8 The initial competition will be keen, and
thereafter the thirty-day period near the end of each contract will be the focal point of
the certification process.' 79 It may be that the certification processes will be a mea-
sure of survival for the better unions; the effort to enlist new members probably will
require monitoring the other unions that offer similar services to comparable units of
workers.
For the new Office of Collective Bargaining the prospect of interunion strife will
be bad news indeed. Each union competing for members will closely watch for
concessions made to the state during bargaining by other unions; and though the
incumbent union may be more experienced, its success or failure will be measured
during representation disputes by how vigorously it acted as adversary to the Office
of Collective Bargaining.' 8 ° One cannot predict fully whether a union's success
against the state's central bargaining agency will be used by other state employee
unions as a weapon in interunion competition-but it is likely to be so.
Questions concerning representation are to be decided through a formal SERB
hearing system.' 8 ' Because unit determinations are not reviewable,18' a great deal of
employer energy may be expended against the more active unions and in favor of the
"no representation" or less energetic union options. Too much lobbying may be an
unfair labor practice, triggering certification of the union without an election. 183 If
there are any relatively unsophisticated public sector personnel officers, their mis-
takes during election periods may be as damning to the employer's cause as errors
made in the private sector. 184 Because the Ohio bill does not have the saving clause
regarding free speech and expression found in the federal labor relations statute, 8 5
the SERB is very likely to develop a jurisprudence of impermissible oral expressions.
Precedents concerning which threats or promises can by made will be followed
closely. Especially difficult will be the interpretation of comments by first-level
managers to employees; the SERB is unlikely to read into the law a broad range of
permissible expressions, when the legislature was aware that the Ohio bill differed
from federal law on this point. 186
178. Andry, supra note 45. Most unions with few or no public sector members have ambitious organizational plans
to cut into the heavy lead enjoyed by the established public employee unions. One representative quoted in the article
stated that the Teamsters see Ohio public workers as "fertile new ground." One public employee union is spending one
million dollars on its Ohio advertising campaign. Id.
179. Onio REv. CODE § 4117.07(C).
180. The Office is established by id. § 4117.10(D). See supra text accompanying note 86.
181. Omtio REv. CODE § 4117.06(A).
182. Id.
183. See id. § 4117.07(A)(2).
184. The period before elections is an especially delicate one for labor related statements by the agents of the
employer. Statements within this period are also likely to have great political visibility. The courts will have to decide
which politicians and which newspaper reports of unnamed official sources will count as unfair coercive statements on
behalf of the employer.
185. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976) provides that the free speech and expression of the parties are not to be unfair labor
practices, unless some element of force or coercion is shown in a particular case.
186. Testimony of Frank Stewart Before the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee, Apr. 6, 1983.
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D. Contract Formation and Negotiation
The Ohio Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act established a schedule for
required collective bargaining that was the best or the worst of all possible schemes,
depending on one's view of the collective bargaining process. In contract formation
there are two principal timing concepts: (1) interunion challenges may occur only
within a narrow window of time, thirty days in every one to three years, depending on
the duration of the contract; 187 and (2) brief periods for renewal or initial negotiations
require that all steps of impasse resolution be expedited. 88 As an administrative
solution to a problem, Ohio's system of bargaining may have a surfeit of riches. The
SERB, while offering many options in the form of fact-finding, mediation, and
conciliation, requires their completion in such a short period that implementation will
be difficult for well-intentioned employers and onerous for those resistant to progress
in labor relations.
Before the formation of an initial contract, the bargaining process starts with a
mandatory discussion period beginning on the ninetieth day before a date set by one
of the parties, usually the recognized collective bargaining representative.' 89 This
period permits the parties, before any SERB involvement, to agree on the procedures
to be used during their discussions.' 90 It is to the advantage of neither to concede
early. It may be said that an employer would lose ground under five of the six
available options,' 9' each of which involves some concession for arbitration.' 92 The
union would generally be better off with arbitration processes that will be available in
cases of impasse. 193 Like any new administrative agency, the SERB can be expected
to referee an early swarm of charges of obstruction and bad faith. In lieu of the ninety
days for initial contracts, renewals have a sixty-day lead time before the known date
of expiration. 194 If the system of self-selected impasse resolution fails, the failure will
be due not to the deficiency of the SERB, but to the unrealistic expectations of the
drafters. 195
During the discussion period, the parties probably will not agree on procedures.
For example, a county probably will not favor multiunit bargaining with a central
union unless it feels that better results can be achieved through one uniform contract
and that it is able to assume the risk of one large county-wide strike. 196 The hope of
187. See OHIo REV. CODE § 4117.07(C)(6).
188. See id. § 4117.14(C).
189. Id. § 4117.14(B)(2).
190. Id.
191. The Coalition of Public Employers, Administrators and Taxpayers issued a joint position statement on May 10,
1983, that was critical of the selection of this option.
192. Of the six, five involve some form of arbitration as a resolution of the dispute and the sixth is undefined and to
be negotiated. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.14(C)(1).
193. Id.
194. Id. § 4117.14(B)(1).
195. The expectation that negotiations will begin with agreement on resolution mechanisms is based on the assump-
tion that the parties will settle most disagreements early, with few to be arbitrated. This is subject to some argument
depending on the extent of the experience of the employer, for the less sophisticated may be so adamant against
concessions that all of the major issues may end up in some form of arbitration proceeding. Objections to the 90-day
period were aired by school spokesmen during the legislative hearings. More Strikes Predicted ifCollective Bargaining
Bill Passes, 56 Gongwer Ohio Report, Apr. 18, 1983, at 2.
196. See OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.06(D)(5).
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the legislative drafters that the parties would "decide how to decide" may reflect an
overexpectation. 9 7 Natural adversaries are unlikely to consent to the use of a process
that may forfeit an advantage for their respective sides. The drafters' hope for mutual-
ity in the collective bargaining process appears to be counterbalanced by the in-
centives that both sides commonly experience-employers to demand continued con-
cessions without strikes and unions to get parties other than the employer to agree
with its needs.
In the optimal case, friendly discourse about procedures will lead to early settle-
ment and agreement in an atmosphere of mutual respect. In the worst case, the fight
among several competing unions will officially begin at the ninetieth day before
contract expiration since competing organizations seeking to become the exclusive
representative can begin campaigns for that status on the ninetieth day. 198 The more
adroit unions can be expected to urge their militancy upon prospective members as a
legitimate recruiting point. Thus, at the sixtieth day before an existing contract
expires, the employee representatives will have just won or reconfirmed their status at
the time when the discussion on new contract terms begins. 1
99
No statute can predict each of the methods of appropriate resolution that could
be used. The final offer settlement procedure, for example, is a relatively recent
arbitration development for public sector legislation. 200 The parties may take any of
the statutory options. Before the final House floor action on the legislation, any other
system of settlement beyond the statutory options required SERB approval or, for
state employees, the legislature's approval. 2 ° ' One reason for deleting that step was
to free the SERB and the legislature from devoting more time to each new additional
procedure that may be developed. The parties are free to resolve their differences by
any means "mutually agreed to.,'202 If an option is used, however, it must be
invoked no later than forty-five days before either the date set by the initial negotia-
tions request, or the expiration of the contract.
20 3
A distinction in timing is made between initial and renewal contracts. The
ninety-day period for bargaining of an initial contract becomes a sixty-day period for
bargaining in renewals. 204 No strike is permitted on an initial contract until after the
ninety days of bargaining have passed.2 0 5
197. Id.
198. Id. § 4117.07(C)(6); from 90 days before expiration no more representation petitions can be filed, and the
SERB will proceed to hold the election among the competing unions. Since the SERB will give 10 days advance notice
and will usually take at least 10 days to prepare, elections can be held at day 70, during the period when active bargaining
is beginning and only 25 days before the first step of impasse-the mediator assignment by the SERB. See LEGisLAnVE
SERVICE COMtISSION, ANALYsIs OF AmENDED SUB. S.B. 133, 115th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. (1983).
199. This juxtaposition of pressures occurs in the same cycle each time because elections of new union representa-
tives and contract renewals are always tied in together. Consequently, the union that holds the exclusive representation
status must be both a good administrator during the contract period and a flexible negotiator ready to enter into active
negotiations if it prevails in the election. The former wins votes, and the latter assures that the victorious union can prevail
over the employer on issues of economic and working conditions.
200. The procedure was first conceived in 1966. Note, Ohio Public Sector Labor Relations Law, supra note 13, at
700.
201. Formerly, approval was needed, but this section was dropped in the House floor bargaining. Oito REV. CODE
§ 4117.14(C)(1).
202. Id. § 4117.14(C)(1)(f).
203. Id. § 4117.14(C).
204. Id. § 4117.14(B)(2).
205. Id. § 4117.14(B)(3).
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After bargaining continues to the point that fifty days remain for action, either
the employer or the union may ask the SERB to intervene and investigate.20 6 The
SERB has five days within which to act. 20 7 The SERB investigation may take either a
conciliatory or an investigatory form. SERB action will be comparable in some cases
to a federal NLRB investigation of potential unfair labor practice charges.20 8 If the
party seeking SERB intervention does not want to start out with such charges, it can
ask the SERB to "determine whether the parties have engaged in collective
bargaining.' '209 If the SERB finds that collective bargaining has only led to an
impasse, or if there are only forty-five days left in the process, the SERB appoints a
mediator from one of its lists.
2 10
E. Mediation Roles
Mediation is the well-known practice of bringing a neutral outsider into col-
lective bargaining for the purposes of finding common ground and suggesting a
compromise solution z. 2 1 The mediator seeks common ground and cautiously splits
the differences between opposing sides. This knowledge gathering process and the
effort to offer alternatives take time. The principal weakness of mediation as an
administrative settlement device in the Act is that the time schedule allows too brief a
period for the performance of successful mediation. Also, mediators propose solu-
tions that are voluntarily accepted or rejected by the parties. There is no incentive to
show mutuality of agreement, however, when both sides know that the next step will
trigger a final offer settlement process that can include final and binding arbitration or
a strike. 2
12
The SERB has two primary types of mediation roles-contract formation and
strike settlement. The SERB has a special Bureau of Mediation that proposes the list
of mediators.2 13 The mediators can also be selected from common sources such as the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and the American Arbitration
Association.2 14
A pragmatic problem for the mediator will arise if he or she first enters the
process too close to the statutory deadline. Experience, particularly in the states of
Pennsylvania 15 and Michigan,216 suggests that the Ohio time provision, under which
206. Id. § 4117.14(C)(2).
207. Id.
208. Unfair labor practice investigation procedures are provided for in federal law at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976) and in
state law at OHio REV. CODE § 4117.12.
209. OHto REV. CODE § 4117.14(C)(2).
210. Id.
211. Mediation in public employment labor relations is a common practice; see, e.g.. R. SsirrH. H. EDWARDS & R.
CLARK, JR., supra note 25, at 792.
212. Testimony of Frank Stewart Before the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee, Apr. 6. 1983.
213. OHIo REV. CODE § 4117.02(H)(1).
214. The parties may agree on their own mediator or may accept the mediator provided to them by the SERB. Id.
§ 4117.14(C).
215. See 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.801 (Purdon Supp. 1965-1982). See also More Strikes Predicted if
Collective Bargaining Bill Passes, 56 Gongwer Ohio Report, Apr. 18, 1983, at 2.
216. See Micti. COMp. LAws ANN. § 423.10 (West 1978).
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a mediator is appointed forty-five days before the expiration of the contract, 2 7 is too
short. A decade of experience in other states indicates that a longer period and the
capacity to explore issues with more flexibility would have improved the Ohio media-
tion system.21
8
When he or she enters the case, at the request of "any party, ' 21 9 the mediator
has powers to bring the two parties together to discuss the issues on which they have
reached an impasse. The mediator has the power to ask the SERB for a fact-finding
panel between the mediator's appointment on the forty-fifth day before contract
expiration and the last day for fact-finding requests, the thirty-first day before ex-
piration. 220 If a mediator enters a bitter impasse situation with only two weeks to
reconcile the parties, his or her situation may be untenable because of the brief period
available. 2
21
In some cases the mediator will need to go beyond the parties to discern the real
bases of the disagreement. The 1975 version of the collective bargaining bill would
have shielded mediators from outside contact.222 The 1983 bill gives them more
leeway. A prudent mediator may be in need of political and taxation advice before he
or she can assess the validity of claimed inability to pay. Thus, when time is limited,
the mediator may have to go directly to those who hold political office. The 1983 law
does not proscribe such contacts.223
Will mediators have any success in narrowing the field of unresolved matters?
With time, a skilled mediator could do so; but the more sophisticated bargainers on
the union side will recognize that conciliation is the final step of the process and that
holding out during mediation is likely to get more during the final settlement step, if it
applies, or in a strike, if it does not. Smaller issues can be mediated, but the media-
tion effort is a distinctly weaker stage of negotiations than either the final binding
arbitration stage or an actual strike. Offers to come halfway may not be made when
the later stages serve the union's purposes so well. 22 4
Mediators from the SERB will need prudence and a good sense of the politically
possible; if the employer fights the SERB role in bargaining, it will be the mediator
from the SERB who will bear the brunt of the challenge. Some friction is likely to
develop between the Office of Collective Bargaining and the SERB mediation staff,
who will be frequent coparticipants in negotiations.22 5
217. Outo REV. CODE § 4117.14(C)(2).
218. Steiber & Wolkinson, Fact-Finding Viewed by Fact-Finders: The Michigan Experience, 28 LAB. L.J. 89
(1977).
219. Either the employer or the union may seek mediation. In some cases there will be mutual desire for mediation;
in others it will be solely the union's desire over employer objections, or vice versa. Id.
220. OHio REV. CODE § 4117.14(C)(3).
221. Testimony of Frank Stewart Before the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee, Apr. 6, 1983.
222. Sub. S.B. 70, 11th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. (1975), would have restrained the nonparty contacts of the
mediators and fact finders.
223. Mediators may contact anyone who will help resolve the disagreement in the particular situation; because the
fact finder is limited in such contacts, it is highly relevant that the legislature in the final 1983 bill did not similarly limit
the mediators. See Yaffe, Fact Finding in Public Education Disputes-Its Values and Limitations: A Neutral View, 3 J.
LAW & EDuc. 267 (1974).
224. Testimony of Frank Stewart Before the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee, Apr. 6, 1983.
225. The role of the Office of Collective Bargaining makes it a natural adversary of the enforcement roles of the
SERB. Outo REV. CODE § 4117.10(D).
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As an administrative agency employee, the mediator will be filling a role com-
monly filled by a completely neutral outsider. SERB mediators will need to be
cautiously optimistic, and their failings at the local level will, for better or worse,
reflect the flaws that local people perceive in the state agency. If mediation works
well, as the voluntary efforts of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service have,
the positive reflection on the SERB will enhance the credibility of the collective
bargaining statute as a whole.226
Ohio's Sunshine Act will not apply to the mediation process,2 2 7 and it is unlikely
that the mediator's offers and proposal documents will be made public under the
Open Records Act. Just as its federal counterpart, the SERB agency would be put out
of business if disclosure were required.22 8 An open records issue may arise if the
drafts of documents that are required to be public229 are leaked. Can or will the SERB
or the Office of Collective Bargaining choose to disclose more records to put the
released material into context?
F. Fact-Finding Stages
Following the process of mediation discussed above, a separate process of
fact-finding may be initiated at the mediator's request. 230 It is important for a new
agency like the SERB to develop guidelines for these requests. Fact-finding can be
expensive, and half the costs will be borne by the SERB. 23 1 The mediator's request
must be acted upon rapidly since no fact-finding panel can be appointed after the
thirty-first day before expiration of the contract, absent mutual agreement.2 32 The
appointments must be made within one day23 3 -suggesting that the Board must, as a
practical matter, plan for the failure of the mediation stage while it is still underway.
The SERB's rules for determining when to institute fact-finding will be important.2 34
The rulemaking powers of the SERB must be used to create the framework for
implementing the fact-finding process. 235 One, two, or three persons can be used on
the panel.2 36 The SERB maintains the candidate list from which the parties select
their candidates. 237 An SERB rule for selection of the "uncommitted" candidate on a
three-member panel will have great impact and may be hotly debated at the rulemak-
ing hearings. 2
38
226. Successful mediation work by the SERB will facilitate the several other missions in which SERB staff members
may be adversaries of the parties to that mediation; the continuing relationships will be affected by early success or failures
of SERB employees.
227. See Onto REv. CODE § 4117.21.
228. Id. See also J. O'RELLY, UNIONS' RiGrrs TO COMPANY INFOR tTION 176 (1980).
229. OHIO REv. CODE § 4117.17.
230. Id. § 4117.14(C)(3).
231. Id. § 4117.14(C)(5). See also Yaffe, supra note 223.
232. OHIO Rev. CODE § 4117.14(C)(3).
233. Id.
234. The rulemaking power in fact-finding will contribute significantly to the fairness of the decision by the fact
finders, an important element in public acceptance of their role. See id. For background, see Yaffe, supra note 223; and
Steiber & Wolkinson, supra note 218.
235. OHIO REv. CODE § 4117.14(C).
236. See id. § 4117.14(C)(3).
237. Id.
238. Id. In Pennsylvania the State Board rather than the local parties select the fact finders. 43 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1101.802 (Purdon Supp. 1965-1982).
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A fact finder forces the parties to confront financial truth. By exposing a city's
true financial picture, for example, fact-finding may show that a theretofore un-
identified fund can cover a raise in salary of twelve percent. A fact finder has a triple
role-mediator, audit examiner, and personnel evaluator. She or he is an outsider
peering into the employer's structure, looking for bargaining answers. 2 39 Subpoena
power, hearings, and testimony are helpful tools for the SERB's mission.
240
Critics have asserted that fact-finding requires more time than the twenty-eight
days allotted to it. The criteria to be applied are not simple; they will be the same as
that which the conciliator will examine in the binding settlement procedure. This set
of criteria was added in the House committee markup of the bill to tighten the fact
finders' decisional process.241 The Act's criteria include past agreements, pay of
comparable workers, legal authority of the employer, traditional considerations ap-
plied in fact-finding (a reference to precedents in other states with fact-finding settle-
ments), and "the ability of the public employer to finance and administer the issues
proposed. '" 242 In retrospect, the final bill's inclusion in fact-finding of criteria in-
tended for the conciliation process reinstated the original 1975 bill's proposed
criteria. 243 Between that 1975 bill and the final 1983 version, the criteria were to have
been set by the SERB. Withdrawal of the SERB's authority to set fact-finding criteria
lessens the qualitative impact the SERB will have on the fact-finding process and
leaves the Board's rulemaking powers strictly in the procedural field. 2'
The final amendments in the 1983 House committee action also placed fact-
finding in direct parallel with conciliation in another aspect. Both sides must state
their position on each disputed issue, 4 5 and final recommendations on each issue will
be made by the panel.246 The safety forces conciliation mechanism uses an identical
approach.2 47 The difference is that recommendations of fact finders can be rejected
by sixty percent of the voting strength in the organization or legislative body, while
conclusions of the conciliator bind the safety forces and employers.
Fact-finding is a neutral exploration of facts that are sometimes overlooked, and
in some cases suppressed, by the employer. 248 The public agency that the fact finders
239. Yaffe, supra note 223, at 270; see also Steiber & Wolkinson, supra note 218.
240. These are the powers provided to the Ohio fact finders; see OHto REv. CODE § 4117.14(C)(4).
241. In the drafts prior to final House action the statute did not define the criteria to be considered by the fact finders.
After the bill cleared the House Committee, an additional sentence was added to state that the panel must take into
consideration the same factors, including employer ability to pay, that the conciliator would need to take into account in a
conciliation award. Id. § 4117.14(G)(7). Thus, precisely the same set of factors will be considered twice, for safety
forces, once at fact-finding and once at conciliation. The criteria that the conciliator would weigh had not previously been
relevant to the non-safety force situation.
242. Id. § 4117.14(G)(7)(c).
243. Sub. S.B. 70, 111 th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess., was passed, but vetoed, in 1975. Its version of § 4117.14(A)(4)
directed fact finders to consider "the logical and traditional concepts and principles vital to the public interest in efficient
and economic government administration, the ability of the public employer to finance and administer the issues pro-
posed, and the effects of the adjustments on the normal standard of public service."
244. See Onto REv. CODE § 4117.4(C)(3)(a).
245. Id. This procedure may dilute the effectiveness of fact-finding since there may be dozens of unresolved issues
in a complex unit, and the same deadlines exist regardless of the number of issues pending.
246. The legislation differentiates between "guidelines for the fact-finding panel to follow in making findings" and
the duty to take into substantive consideration certain significant factors in the decisional process. See id.
§ 4117.14(C)(3)(e).
247. Compare the identical factors to be used in id. §§ 4117.14(C)(3)(e) and .14(G)(7); the first is the fact-finding
stage, the second the conciliation stage.
248. Yaffe, supra note 223, at 270.
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can show to have concealed its ability to pay loses credibility. The employer is in a
very delicate position, of course, since its own accountants and financial analysts will
be members of the bargaining unit.249 From the employer's standpoint, fact-finding
procedure in the new law can be criticized as too superficial, too fast, and likely to be
slanted against the employer. 250 Like the individuals who serve as mediators and
conciliators, the fact-finding representatives on the SERB list probably do not live
with the employer's problems and may not reflect the sentiment of the voting
taxpayers.2 5 1
One item of fact-finding procedure is clear: the Ohio law prohibits shopping for
settlements-the occasional practice of a fact finder to seek a middle ground with
politically important nonparties. For example, a fact finder who learns that the city
manager's offer of five percent can be overridden by a city council majority, who
might give 6.5 percent, might want to go to the key council leaders for informal talks.
Or, the negotiator for a local nursing unit that is represented by a statewide union may
insist on eleven percent, but the fact finder may know that the statewide union would
be satisfied with eight percent. The law forbids public discussion of settlement
recommendations.25 2 A violation of the provision can be punished in the courts, and
courts will have to decide whether a contract based on a fact finder recommendation
is voidable.
The fact-finding process can be characterized as a means of gathering support
for a settlement. The data gathering must be completed and the conclusions reached,
however, within fourteen days after appointment 253-- a timetable that may be too
short for gathering much "new" information. The burden of error in the fact finders'
conclusions falls against the employer. If the fact finders take the union's recom-
mended position, they give a stamp of approval to the employer's ability to pay. At
one time, the conciliation step, which follows fact-finding for the safety forces,
included choices among both parties' recommended findings as well as those of the
fact finders.25 4 This was changed in the last set of amendments; and recommenda-
249. Only those employees who are in a close continuing relationship with officials who directly participate in the
bargaining are excluded as "confidential," OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.01(J); others who supply data are likely to be
members of the bargaining unit for office employees. Access to many of the same records will be available through the
political process, or under the Ohio Open Records Act, Otuo REv. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Page 1978); State ex rel. Plain
Dealer Publishing Co. v. Krouse, 51 Ohio St. 2d I, 364 N.E.2d 854 (1977).
250. In fact-finding, "an unworkable short period of time is provided" so the "true collective bargaining process
will disappear as unions will not bargain in good faith when they know they can try for an even better contract with an
arbitrator." Memo to Mayors and Managers Regarding Collective Bargaining Legislation from J. Coleman, Ohio Muni-
cipal League, Mar. 24, 1983, at 3.
251. The Municipal League suggested the same. Id. There is no prohibition on placing a resident on the fact-finding
panel, but a fact finder is often identifiable with one or another side and an outsider fares better. The negative aspect of the
outsider selection is that it would be "unrealistic to assume that a fact finder can come into a strange community and in a
matter of hours accurately assess the political power of the disputants in that community. " Yaffe, supra note 223, at 269.
252. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.14(C)(4)(f). For a useful discussion of the political dynamics of the fact-finding
process, see Yaffe, supra note 223. See also R. SMITH, H. EDWARDS & R. CLARK, JR., supra note 25, at 792-94. That
political element cannot be ignored but it is excluded from consideration by the statute at this stage.
253. OHIo REV. CODE § 4117.14(C)(5).
254. This provision was one of the few Republican amendments accepted in committee. Amend. 1-30, House
Commerce and Labor Committee, by Representative James M. Petro. The provision may have been too flexible,
however, and was stricken on the House floor. It was not included in the final statute.
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tions from fact finders are considered, but are not one of the conciliator's available
255options.
5
Each of the parties has a legitimate need to "capture" the fact finders' conclu-
sion on key issues. The conciliator may tend to favor the side whose views are
aligned with those of the neutral fact finder.2 56 A settlement of a strike threat may be
more feasible if the union has the backing of the neutral fact finder's recommenda-
tions. For non-safety forces the chance to win the publicity battle by capturing
favorable recommendations is an important opportunity. Though such workers can
strike, it is more prudent to strike for concessions that have the publicized support of
neutral fact finders.
The end of the routine negotiation process will come, at most, seven days after
the findings and recommendations of the fact finders are made.257 If both sides agree,
the fact finder's recommendations will be accepted. But the House committee in 1983
adopted a novel concept of democratizing rejections. Votes must be taken if rejection
is considered, making acceptance easier. 25 8 Either the employer or the employee
organization can reject by a three-fifths majority. Union organizations' voting
methods on this particular type of balloting will be prescribed by SERB
regulations. 25 9 If the vote for the contract is at least forty-one percent of the body, the
contract is ratified. 260 The late amendment in 1983 means that the legislature may be
asked to vote down a tentatively approved state contract, but sixty percent of the
members of both houses will be necessary to reject the state contract.26 ' For example,
a Republican Senate minority of sixteen would need six Democratic supporters to
upset a contract in the state Senate.2 62
If no rejection occurs, negotiators for both sides then frame the contract accord-
255. Otio REV. CODE § 4117.14(G)(6). It is the duty of the SERB, independent of the parties' submissions, to give
a copy of the fact finder's recommendations to the conciliator. While the SERB is neutral, there may be conciliators who
view the fact finder's recommendations as implicitly endorsed by the SERB because the agency presents those recom-
mendations to the conciliator. In a sense, however, they are the only neutral document that the conciliator will get from
anyone.
256. The effectiveness of this information will vary with each situation. Surely, a reviewing court would be more
likely to ratify the conciliator's arbitration award if the evidence includes a nearly identical set of findings by a fact finder
who examined the same information.
257. See Onto REv. CODE § 4117.14(D).
258. Id. § 4117.14(C)(6). A management effort to make the conciliator awards binding unless rejected by the same
three-fifths majority of the legislative body was rejected along party lines in the Senate. Bargaining Bill for Public
Employees Approved by Senate, 56 Gongwer Ohio Report, Apr. 21, 1983, at 1.
259. Problems may arise when the SERB rules "governing the procedures and methods for public employees to vote
on the recommendations" conflict with the bylaws of the union involved. At the least, the unions will be active
participants in any hearing on the proposed rule which will govern this voting. OHto REv. CODE § 4117.02(H)(8)(c).
Query whether the duty of fair representation will require that nonmembers be permitted to participate in the mandatory
statutory vote of "public employees" on the recommendations of fact finders. Id. § 4117.14(C)(6).
260. See id. § 4117.14(C)(6).
261. The legislature is the only "legislative body" for most state workers, excluding higher education facilities. See
the definition of "employer" at § 4117.01(B) and (C)(2). The Ohio legislature is the legislative body that may reject
contracts which emerge from fact-finding. Id. § 4117.14(C)(6).
262. The bill passed the Senate along a strict party line vote. The strongest minority presence is in the Senate, which
could, by having its members vote "no" to prevent the required 60% approval of a contract, precipitate a test of the new
law. This political maneuvering, despite its many negative aspects for the workers and legislators alike, would force the
non-safety force union into a strike. This result would place the Office of Collective Bargaining, which had first agreed to
the fact finders' report, in a difficult position. Because this is not improbable, it raises the question why the House floor
amendments, the last legislative action on the bill, included such a potentially divisive provision.
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ingly and execute it promptly. But an impasse is reached if three-fifths of either the
organization or the legislators vote to reject the tentative agreement.263 The system is
designed to ease agreement and encumber rejection.
G. Impasse Resolution
When all else fails, and a contract is not going to be initiated or renewed
peacefully, an impasse exists. SERB powers become extremely important, and their
prudent exercise becomes vital. When the parties' electoral bodies reject the fact
finder's recommendations, three options exist. First, designated police and safety
forces must go to a special final offer settlement. 264 Second, other employees may go
on strike. 265 Third, the employees who are not in the safety class may proceed to the
next stage of the special procedures that they chose in their contract, which might
include one of several forms of arbitration, including citizen's arbitration, a novel
procedure. 266 The options would be agreed to in advance, though several, like
citizen's arbitration, are rather unlikely vehicles for experimentation. 267
The principle behind separate safety and nonsafety remedies is to reward those
who for urgent policy reasons cannot be allowed to strike. Originally, traditional
safety forces like guards, fire fighters, and police were segregated from the strike
category in Ohio, as they have been in other states.268 Politically motivated in-
clusions muddied the differentiations, however, with the addition of clerks from the
retirement systems and exclusive nurse units to the binding arbitration classes.269
If public employees are not included in the designated no-strike classifications,
they may strike ten days after their membership, or the employer legislative body,
rejects the fact-finding recommendations. If, for example, the union's contract
with a school board expires April 30, 1984, and the fact-finding report issues May 1,
the teachers' rejection of the report on May 2 can be accompanied by a notice to the
SERB and the employer that their strike begins May 12. If the contract voluntarily
calls for another procedural stage, such as arbitration, the strike cannot take place
until all contract steps have been fulfilled.2 1
263. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.14(C)(6).
264. Id. § 4117.14(D)(1).
265. Id. § 4117.14(D)(2).
266. Id. § 4117.14(E). A strike by a group that is otherwise permitted to strike is illegal if the group has agreed, by
contract, to some form of post-fact-finding resolution of disputes, and the entire settlement process has not been
completed. Section 4117.15(A) applies because the alternative settlement procedures are "settlement procedures" for
purposes of the strike bar in § 4117.14(A).
267. Id. § 4117.14(C)(I)(e).
268. The 1975 bill was far less inclusive in the safety category, with nine fewer categories of workers than were
covered by the final 1983 text. Among the additions were youth leaders, retirement clerks, nurses, paramedics, psychiat-
ric attendants and dispatchers. Compare coverage in Sub. S.B. 70, § 4117.15(A), 111 th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. (1975),
as passed, iith final 1983 Act, OHIO REv. CODE § 4117.14(D)(1).
269. OHIO REv. CODE § 4117.14(D)(1). The retirement clerks were added on the House floor; none of the published
sources reveal why they were reclassified as "safety" forces, or how one would treat a retirement clerk who held other
duties, e.g., a school district payroll clerk who administered a retirement system in addition to other duties. One possible
explanation is that recipients of the checks were represented by the unions of current employees whose interests properly
were reflected in the House floor action on the bill.
270. Id. § 4117.14(D)(2).
271. Id. § 4117.14(E).
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Safety force workers cannot strike; for them, a strike would be a clear violation
of law, subject to rapid injunctive relief in the courts. 272 Because the strike weapon is
unavailable, the final offer settlement process is sweetened to make up for the lack of
more militant actions. First, the SERB orders the parties to conciliate. 273 Second, a
list of five conciliators from the SERB is offered. 274 If the parties cannot agree, the
SERB appoints its own candidate or appoints a person from the American Arbitration
Association's list.
275
The form of mandatory arbitration used for safety forces differs considerably
from state to state. 276 A change from the original Ohio provision for arbitration was
agreed to during legislative development, and the term "conciliation" may or may
not carry the benefit of the arbitration case law for affected employers. 277 It is likely
that the change in the name of the procedure will not prevent direct translation of
Ohio's arbitration precedents since the legislature tied this section to the statutory
process for commercial arbitrations. 278 Transfer may be more difficult for review of
binding awards, however, since Ohio uses commercial arbitration review
standards, 279 and other states have review adjusted to public employee settings.28 °
California uses a test of whether the arbitration award is "repugnant" to state labor
law-a much tighter standard than Ohio's.
281
Conciliators enjoy several advantages. First, their schedules are much more
flexible, especially when the prior contract has expired. As much as twenty-five days
may pass between the order to conciliate and the parties' submission of "final offer
272. Strikes by public safety employees would be a violation of the Act that could be enjoined as a matter of equity,
even where § 4117.15(A) might not apply. Interview with Dennis Morgan, Counsel to Communications Workers Union,
June 6, 1983. The employer could seek equitable relief for a statutory violation, or the SERB could exercise its unfair
labor practice jurisdiction. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.13(A). The provision for "clear and present danger" injunctions in
§ 4117.16(A) is inapplicable to safety force strikes.
273. Id. § 4117.14(D)(1).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See, e.g., MICH. Cosmp. LAWS ANN. § 423.233 (West 1978); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 209 (McKinney 1983);
43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.805 (Purdon Supp. 1965-1982).
277. The bill had its direct legislative roots in an arbitration procedure. See Sub. S.B. 222 (1977), at proposed
§ 4117.14. When S.B. 133 was introduced in 1983, it had an arbitration system, but a subcommittee amendment adopted
shortly thereafter changed it to "conciliation" and allowed the parties to select an alternative means of conciliation from a
list of approved methods. Binding Arbitration Removed from Collective Bargaining Bill, 56 Gongwer Ohio Report, Apr.
11, 1983, at 1. Because the sponsor introduced the bill as an issue by issue final settlement process, Press Release of
Senator Eugene Branstool on Introduction of S.B. 133 (Mar. 18, 1983), and because § 4117.14 as passed provides the
same, Ohio's conciliators are not creators but choosers. Ohio courts will never face the Pennsylvania courts' question
whether an arbitrator has power to expand the literal terms of the contract. See Ringgold Area School Dist. v. Ringgold
Educ. Ass'n, 489 Pa. 380, 414 A.2d 118 (1980).
278. Oito REV. CODE ch. 2711 is incorporated to provide the method of review for arbitration decisions. OHIo REV.
CODE § 4117.14(H). It is significant that, originally, the bills that preceded this Act would have expressly limited both the
jurisdiction and scope of the review of a conciliation award. Sub. S.B. 70, which was passed, but vetoed, in 1975, would
have allowed review of an arbitrator's award in the courts of appeals on grounds that (1) the arbitrator lacked or exceeded
jurisdiction in the award; (2) fraud, collusion or unlawful means were used; or (3) provisions of the arbitration section
were not followed. Sub. S.B. 70 (1975). That bill created no right to a jury as § 2711.03 does for cases of refusals to
arbitrate; and the 1975 version would not have allowed vacating an award, as § 2711.10(D) does.
279. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.10 (Page 1981).
280. See, e.g., Leechburg Area School Dist. v. Dale, 492 Pa. 515, 424 A.2d 1309 (1981); Ringgold Area School
Dist. v. Ringgold Educ. Ass'n, 489 Pa. 380, 414 A.2d 118 (1981); Division 85, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Port
Authority, 62 Pa. Commw. 528, 437 A.2d 105 (1981); and N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw § 213 (McKinney 1983).
281. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3514.5 (West 1980). Review of the award is by the administrative board. Ohio uses the
courts, not the SERB, to review awards.
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and rationale" papers.2 82 Presumably, the two sides will modify the offers that each
made to the fact finder during the preceding stage.283 Second, the fact finder's
recommendations on each issue are part of the record, although they are not included
as a third option for the conciliator's consideration. 284 The task of selecting from two
options is more difficult than creating a contract from the ground up. The legislators
intended to omit from this concept the commercial arbitrator's powers to fashion
remedies by creating a middle ground solution. 285 Third, the conciliators are sup-
ported by the SERB, and the legislature has given them extensive powers.2 86 Their
position is stronger than that of the fact finders and requires less diplomacy than the
mediation role.- Finally- the conciliator has broad authority to select between the
competing solutions. 287
Issues to be decided in final offer settlement proceedings should have been well
shaped before the case comes to the conciliator. Though the doctrine of waiver or
exhaustion of issues remains to be developed, 288 one can expect that in each case
where there has been fact-finding, the conciliator will not entertain bargaining issues
that were not raised in fact-finding. 289 Because the process is designed to be inte-
grated, the statute cannot encourage any hidden agenda items. The advantage of
conciliation as a final step would be lost if new issues were raised late in the
bargaining. However, this puts the burden on both parties to watch the other care-
fully; so long as an issue remains open it can be concluded against one's interest at the
conciliation stage.
290
282. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.14(G)(3).
283. Id. § 4117.14(C)(3)(a). Offers made to the fact finder, however, may be identical to those made to the
conciliator. Id. § 4117.14(G)(3).
284. See id. § 4117.14(G)(2)-(3). At one time, the bill allowed the conciliator to offer the fact finder's recommenda-
tions as a third option if either party's position was desirable to the conciliator. This amendment was offered by
Republican Representative James M. Petro; it was accepted in the House Committee but stricken on the House floor. OHIo
LEGISLATIVE SERVICE CoMMIsSIoN, ANALYSIS OF AM. SUB. S.B. 133, at 14 (June 1983).
285. The primary sponsor of the bill, Senator Eugene Branstool, defended this approach: "[An outside conciliator
would merely pick from the best offer from labor and the best offer from management." Press Release (May 4, 1983).
The conciliation change from the original bill had Senator Branstool's support. Binding Arbitration Removed from
Collective Bargaining Bill, 56 Gongwer Ohio Report, Apr. 11, 1983, at I. At one time, Senator Branstool had considered
that the arbitrator could revert back to the fact finder's report "if an arbitrator feels the last best offers are unreasonable."
Subcommittee Begins Redrafting Collective Bargaining Bill, 56 Gongwer Ohio Report, Apr. 7, 1983, at 1.
286. See OHiO REV. CODE § 4117.14(G).
287. Id. § 4117.14(G)(7).
288. Arbitration case law suggests that waiver should be considered as a defensive issue. Vulcan-Cincinnati, Inc. v.
United Steelworkers, 113 Ohio App. 360, 173 N.E.2d 709 (1960); Annot., 26 A.L.R.3d 608 (1969).
289. An arbitrator should, ideally, be dealing with a smaller number of issues than those presented to the fact finders
at the earlier stage. It was the primary sponsor's intention that "only the toughest issues would reach conciliation for
settlement." Senator Eugene Branstool, Press Release (May 4, 1983). However, the bill as amended on the House floor
speaks of "the recommendations" of the fact finders as a package. Under the scheme of § 4117.14(C) as adopted, all
unresolved issues go to the panel (subsection (C)(3)(a)); the panel must make recommendations on all issues (subsection
(C)(5)); and the vote of the employer legislature and the employee membership is on "the recommendations" (subsection
(C)(6)). In the case of the safety forces the conciliator then gets those issues that are subject to collective bargaining and
"upon which the parties have not reached agreement." OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.14(G)(1). It may be unlikely that the
negotiators will agree on issues that their principal constituencies have rejected by vote during the 25 days available for
identifying the "unresolved issues." Id. § 4117.14(G)(3). An empirical study should be done to evaluate whether the
existence of conciliation for all issues reduces the efficacy of fact-finding as a stage in the settlement process.
290. Parties must keep close track of what matters are "issues," and part of the inherent obligation of bargaining is
to specify issues in sufficient detail.
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Several statutory factors must be considered by the conciliator. 29' These are
essential items, for the otherwise binding award could be reversed if the conciliator
exceeded his or her statutory powers. 292 Because the drafting of the factors was done
largely by pro-employee proponents, not all of the considerations rest equally well
with all affected parties. The conciliator will take into account standard items like the
bargaining and contract history, and the employer's legal authority. Additional fac-
tors, such as comparable work, pay, and job conditions, as well as any stipulations,
will be considered.2 93
Two aspects that are sure to be litigated round out the criteria. The conciliator
must consider the public interest, including "the ability of the public employer to
finance and administer the issue proposed, and the effect of the adjustments on the
normal standard of public service," 294 and other factors "normally or traditionally
taken into consideration" in private or public labor arbitrations.295 Empirical re-
search can determine how well the conciliator assessment jibes with the fact finder's
recommendations on the same set of criteria.2 96
V. STRIKES AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
A. In General
The ultimate base of economic power for any employee organization engaged in
collective bargaining is the ability to strike. Volumes have been written about
whether a limited right to strike for public sector employees is supported by labor
relations theory. 297 Ohio's recognition in the 1983 Act that most public employees
291. These factors include: past agreements; comparable pay for comparable work in other private and public
employment; authority of the employer, presumably including taxation authority; stipulations of parties; other "normal
and traditional" factors in public or private arbitration; and the key item: "the interests and welfare of the public, the
ability of the public employer to finance and administer the issues proposed, and the effect of the adjustments on the
normal standard of public service." Id. § 4117.14(G)(7).
292. These factors, read in conjunction with the standard of judicial review, do not mesh well. See OHfo REv. CODE
Ar. § 2711. 10(D) (Page 1981). That standard asks whether the arbitrator executed his or her power to decide the matter
within these criteria "so imperfectly" that a "mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made." Id. Once the arbitrated awards are appealed, the matter is in the hands of the courts, which use a commercial
rather than a labor relations standard for reversing arbitrations. This may prove to be a systemic discontinuity that places
unions' more controversial conciliation victories in jeopardy.
293. what work is comparable will undoubtedly be the subject of briefs by the parties in support of their respective
final offers. The conciliator may be perplexed by the task of comparing a public job, with its benefits and character of
relative security, to a private job of the same name, higher pay, and lower fringe benefits.
294. The ability to pay is one of the primary factors that the conciliator must consider, according to the bill's
principal sponsor. "An appeal to the courts would result if this is not considered." Senator Eugene Branstool, Press
Release (May 4. 1983).
295. The term is not defined in Ohio, Michigan, or California, but it may include prevailing practices, responsibility
of the position, steadiness of employment, fringe benefits, ability to pay, wage pattern, and productivity. See F. ELKOURt
& E. ELKOURI, How ARBrrRATiON WoRmS (3d ed. 1973).
296. Comparability may reflect either time pressure on the fact finder or generosity of the conciliator. A pay increase
may not be comparable, for example, if the conciliator receives new information about increases in the tax base or
property tax assessments unavailable to the fact finders because of their limited time to study the issues. It is in the interest
of both sides quickly and accurately to get the data before the fact finders because awaiting a conciliation decision may
mean months of delay. The Ohio legislature was told that the arbitration-conciliation process could take as long as a year,
as it has in Michigan. Memo to the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee from J. Coleman, Ohio Municipal League,
Apr. 19, 1983.
297. The famous labor arbitrator, Theodore Kheel, said it best: "Our dilemma is thus apparent .... we want to
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should have the right to strike298 represents a major change from the draconian
Ferguson Act of 1947.299 A "strike," as defined under the amended law, begins with
"concerted action," an element not previously required.300 It includes slowdowns,
as well as the more common stoppages that had been covered previously; 30 1 and, as
with prior law, the action must be intended to induce, influence, or coerce a change in
employment conditions, such as pay or privileges. 30 2 The amended strike definition
deletes the alternative intention test under the 1947 law, which treated actions taken
to influence other persons unlawfully as a strike. 30 3 The amendment also changes the
proscription against stoppage from "unlawfully" ceasing work to "willfully" doing
so.
3 04
In the 1983 Act the legislature modified the controversial and cumbersome
procedures of the 1947 statute.30 5 Unfortunately, additional procedural steps in the
1983 Act appear even more difficult to administer. Prior law required the "superior"
to notify the employee that he or she was considered to be on strike. 30 6 Severe
punishments would follow. Many employers did not choose to invoke the law.
30 7
Under the new law, many strikes will be lawful at the conclusion of a bargaining
impasse. In the illegal strike situations, the employer must ask the SERB to decide
the status of the employees engaged in a strike. 30 8 The employer cannot decide, on its
own, that an employee is on an illegal strike; it cannot act against striking employees
unless (1) the SERB has been brought in, at the employer's request, to make a
determination of legality; (2) the SERB finds that the employer did not provoke the
strike; and (3) each employee is given individual notice by the employer that he or she
is engaged in a strike found illegal by the SERB. 309 This multistep administrative
prevent strikes and simultaneously grant public employees the right to bargain collectively and participate in the de-
termination of their working conditions. But collective bargaining, true joint determination, cannot exist without the
prospect of a strike." Kheel, supra note 21, at 188. See also Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public
Employment, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 943 (1969); Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 Mtct. L. REv. 931 (1969); Note,
The Strike and Its Alternatives in Public Employment, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 549.
298. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.14(D)(2).
299. 1947 Ohio Laws 122 (repealed 1983).
300. OHIo REV. CODE § 4117.01(H).
301. Id. This was criticized in testimony by an expert on federal labor law, who observed: "A slowdown is the most
difficult form of concerted activity to prove, which is the one reason why it is not protected in the federal system."
Testimony of Frank Stewart Before the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee, Apr. 6, 1983.
302. OHIo REV. CODE § 4117.01(H).
303. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(A) (Page 1980), repealed by 1983 Ohio Laws 140, also included the purpose
of "intimidating, coercing, or unlawfully influencing others from remaining in or from assuming such public employ-
ment." This was deleted, but it still may be prohibited as an unfair labor practice. See OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.11 (B).
304. Compare OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.01(H) with former OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(A) (Page 1980).
305. When the bill was introduced in the 1983 legislature, its primary sponsor said, "[The Ferguson Act is simply
not working ... [lt only provides penalties, it does not provide tools to help parties resolve their disputes." Press
Release of Senator Eugene Branstool on Introduction of S.B. 133 (Mar. 18, 1983). Compare the Ohio situation with
Decker, supra note 89.
306. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.04 (Page 1980), repealed by 1983 Ohio Laws 140, § 4.
307. Every one of the management and labor counsel interviewed for this article stressed the unevenness of
application of the Ferguson Act penalties. Recent commentators have agreed. Note, Collective Bargaining, supra note 33;
Note, Ohio Public Sector Labor Relations Law, supra note 13.
308. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.23(A).
309. Id. § 4117.23.
1983] OHIO PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 921
adjudication will be arduous for employers. 31 0 By the time the determinations and
notification are made, the employees may settle and come back to work.
Although the procedures for penalizing a striking employee appear to be se-
verely limited, it is predictable that some employers will try to use them anyway. The
penalty process is convoluted. Only those employers who scrupulously follow pro-
cedures can impose effective penalties. The due process provisions of the strike
penalty clause are excellent models for advocates of the employee position because
they allow only limited administrative remedies to the employer. 3 11 It will be appar-
ent over the first few years of the new law that public employers have lost a credible
threat of punishment. The law merely adds a procedural inhibition to the inherent
political inhibitions that elected officials must face when they consider penalizing
their employees.312 In this aspect, the motivations of private sector and public sector
employers diverge the most.
313
There are also two subsidiary losses to the public employer in the amended law's
strike provisions. One is that a lockout cannot be conducted by the employer against
the employee. 31 4 Employer advocates argued strenuously that this prohibition ties the
employer's hands when predictability of public services is crucial and workers repeat-
edly threaten to strike.31 5 A second problem for employers is that a slowdown must
be treated as a strike, with all the attendant SERB determination and appeal steps. 3 16
Punishing a slowdown as a "strike" may be extremely cumbersome, but it may be
the only remedy available. 3 17
B. Classes of Strikes
Although the statute fails to define systematically the classes of strikes now
recognizable under the Ohio law, it is possible to identify those classes:
310. Id. § 4117.23(B)(3). This section provides for administrative review. The Act does not specify the means of
appeal of the Board's decision. The venue for appellate review of the SERB order is limited to the court of common pleas
for Franklin County in Columbus. Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Page Supp. 1983).
311. See Onto REV. CODE § 4117.23.
312. Elected officials generally lose votes, campaign workers, and supporters when they alienate large numbers of
public employees who work in their jurisdiction.
313. The pardigmatic relationship between private employer and private employee is one in which the employee
delivers only labor on assigned tasks, with such loyalty as the employer can extract by contractual limitations. By contrast,
public employers who are elected officials need positive reinforcement of their policies from the general public at election
time. The power of public employee organizations as electoral forces in Ohio is undisputed and, indeed, was one of the
factors cited by opponents of the new Act: "Labor organizations contributed more than Si million to Gov. Richard
Celeste's campaign and huge sums more for election of [legislators] .... They are already halfway home on receiving up
to S50 million a year on their investment" [in the form of public employee union dues]. Jordan, Labor's Investment Reaps
Dividends, Columbus Dispatch, May 1, 1983, at F4.
314. Otio REv. CODE § 4117.11(A)(7).
315. Testimony of Frank Stewart Before the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee, Apr. 6, 1983.
316. A slowdown is a "strike," Onto REV. CODE § 4117.01(H), so the employer must use the SERB remedy,
provided in § 4117.23(B), for any relief short ofa court order. City of Dover v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local
1312, 114 N.H. 481, 322 A.2d 918 (1974), held that a slowdown can be treated as a strike-like job action.
317. There is great difficulty in proving a slowdown. Testimony of Frank Stewart Before the Senate Commerce and
Labor Committee, Apr. 6, 1983. A strike needs to manifest certain intentions before the union can be said to be actually
on strike. Onto REv. CODE § 4117.01(H). Police work, however, is so inherently discretionary that Ohio employers will
find it difficult, if not impossible, to prove facts sufficient to punish police slowdowns under § 4117.23. Cf. City of Dover
v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1312, 114 N.H. 481, 322 A.2d 918 (1974) (employer responses to police
officers' quasi-strikes), and Purcell v. Greenwald, 1981-83 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 37361 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
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(1) lawful strikes posing no public danger;3 18
(2) lawful strikes posing some "clear and present" public danger, which may
be enjoined;3 19
(3) lawful strikes posing some public danger that is not "clear and present,"
which cannot be enjoined;320
(4) lawful strikes posing a clear and present public danger that have been en-
joined for sixty days, termination of which bars the court from continuing or impos-
ing new injunctions; 321
(5) strikes that are unlawful because of their timing, for example, during fact-
finding under an existing contract; 3
22
(6) strikes that are unlawful because of the class of worker involved, for ex-
ample, fire fighters; 323 and
(7) strikes that otherwise meet the definition of "strike" but are not treated as
such as a matter of law because of the workers' "good faith" belief that there are
"dangerous or unhealthful working conditions at the place of employment which are
abnormal to the place of employment." '324
One could forgive confusion on the part of an employer considering these differences
in definitions.
The competing factions debated statistical projections of future strikes during the
Senate and House passage. 325 Heavy political cannon fire was exchanged between
the warring political sides, with opponents predicting massive strikes, and proponents
countering with statistics suggesting that Ohio needed the law to lower its rash of
public sector strikes. 3
26
Strikes can be challenged in court, but only under the statutory scheme. During
the remedial procedure, discussed below, the SERB will attempt mediation and
attempt to restart collective bargaining. 327 If no judicial relief is allowed, the SERB
may still make efforts to mediate the disputes. 328
Employers especially will notice that a stoppage brought about by unhealthful
working conditions is deemed not to be a strike under the law. This provision was
first added in the 1977 proposal to allow strikes for the avoidance of "dangerous"
working conditions.329 In 1983 the word "unhealthful" was added when the bill was
318. Ono REV. CODE § 4117.14(D)(2).
319. Id. § 4117.16(A).
320. See id. The judge will hear evidence regarding the degree of danger before ruling.
321. Id.
322. Id. § 4117.15(A).
323. Id.
324. Id. § 4117.01(H).
325. Press Release, Senator Eugene Branstool (May 4, 1983); Monroe Testimony, supra note 2 (arguing that bill
will reduce strikes); Testimony of John R. Stewart, Ohio Information Committee, Before the Senate Commerce and Labor
Committee, Mar. 29, 1983; Memo to the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee from J. Coleman, Ohio Municipal
League, Apr. 19, 1983 (arguing that bill will not prevent strikes).
326. According to statistics quoted in the statement of sponsor Senator Branstool on introduction of S.B. 133, 115th
Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess., Ohio had 434 public employee work stoppages in 1971-81. Press Release of Senator Eugene
Branstool on Introduction of S.B. 133 (Mar. 18, 1983).
327. See OHIo REv. CoDE § 4117.16(B).
328. See id. § 4117.14(D)(2).
329. Sub. S.B. 222, 112th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess., which contained proposed OHIo REv. CODE § 4117.01(H), was
adopted, but vetoed, in 1977. At that time, it covered only abnormally hazardous working conditions directly affecting
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reintroduced, presumably to address conditions that can cause cancer or other illnes-
ses, and are chronically rather than acutely "dangerous." 330 Little legislative history
on this provision exists; it may be related to mining and industrial hazards, for which
the Supreme Court has found strikes to be justifiable. 33' The Ohio Municipal League
was particularly critical of the potential for abuse inherent in the term "un-
healthful.", 332 A debate about the vagueness of the term, and the difficulty of its
interpretation at the worksite, understandably arose from employers' objections to its
usage.
333
A partial accommodation was reached when the words "abnormal to the place
of employment" were added as a qualifier to the unhealthfulness of a work situation.
If the worksite is an interstate highway, high-speed truck traffic is both dangerous and
normal. If the employees object to working without air conditioning, they must show
that air conditioning is both normal to their worksite and that, as a matter of good
faith, its absence is unhealthful. Litigation was predicted by employers over the scope
of the exception's coverage. If free asbestos particles may at some concentration be a
lung hazard, the discovery of asbestos in the insulation of a school building would be
a cause of significant dispute, for unhealthfulness may be asserted even though the
school's existing insulation cannot be said to be "abnormal" to that worksite. Pro-
cedural intervention by the SERB is likely to define the scope;334 as with other SERB
adjudications, this kind of determination will require support in the form of sub-
stantial evidence. 335 This is one subject on which the SERB would be well advised to
adjudicate early and cautiously.
C. Strikes and the Courts
The SERB is given a very unusual power by one provision of the Act. The
statute terminates the equity jurisdiction of the courts over employee strikes, with
employees at the place of employment. One close judicial parallel is the comment that "a workplace can hardly be
considered 'unsafe' unless it threatens the workers with a significant risk of harm." Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642 (1980).
330. Onto REv. CODE § 4117.01(H). A possible factor in this change was the parallel effort of the AFL-CIO to enact
statewide chemical ingredient disclosure information--the "right to know" legislation-that ostensibly would enable
worker self-help against cancer hazards. State workers had been excluded from the protected class when the city of
Cincinnati adopted its own ordinance, patterned on a state AFL-CIO draft, in 1982. O'Reilly, Right to Know: Cincinnati's
More Righteous, Less Knowing Experiment, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 337 (1983).
331. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980); Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
332. The Municipal League found this provision "most objectionable," because cities would have no recourse if
police decided that crimes made their working conditions dangerous or firemen disdained a fire as unhealthful. Memo to
Mayors and Managers Regarding Collective Bargaining Legislation from J. Coleman, Ohio Municipal League, Mar. 24,
1983.
333. See id.
334. The SERB will become involved when the employer demands a determination of illegality. Onto REv. CODE
§ 4117.23.
335. Although Onto REv. CODE § 4117.23(B) does not indicate how a negative determination on an employer's
request is to be reviewed, the Act, in § 4117.02(M), makes an omnibus reference to chapter 119 procedure. This means
that the order will be reviewable under the broad substantial evidence standard of Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Page
Supp. 1983), but apparently all such orders must be filed in the court of common pleas for Franklin County, because of the
venue reservation contained in the second paragraph of § 119.12.
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narrow exceptions, 336 and replaces it with a remedy at law.337 This remedy at law is
circumscribed by a novel provision. The court is divested of jurisdiction seventy-two
hours after entering a temporary restraining order in a strike case. 3 38 The administra-
tive adjudicatory order, declaring a court injunction proper, is an absolute condition
precedent to the jursidiction of the courts. 3 3 9 This is an exponential increase in
administrative agency authority as compared to the traditional primary jurisdiction
theory.340 Here, a constitutional power of the court-the power to resolve a matter
arising in equity-must yield to a determination by. a statutory adjudicator, the
SERB.
341
It can readily be argued that Ohio's constitutional separation of powers is more
flexible than the federal constitutional provision. 342 It also can be argued that the
legislative scheme supplies the remedy at law subject to reasonable conditions, which
reserve control over litigation to the expert agency, because an absence of control
would wreak injunctive havoc with the scheme of the statute. But the ultimate arbiters
of access to judicial review are not administrators or legislators, but judges. 343 This
inherent conflict is likely to surface early in the new statute's administration.
The Act creates two channels of judicial relief from strikes-one for workers
other than safety forces and one for safety forces. The general workers can go on
strike after the ten-day notice period, which follows the mediation and fact-finding
discussed above. 3 44 The law enables them to strike and puts a heavy burden on the
employer to restrain their activity. 345 The local or state employer cannot control
whether an injunction issues. At best, the employer can obtain a seventy-two hour
temporary restraining order by convincing a judge that a "clear and present danger to
the health or safety of the public" exists. 3 46 The matter then goes immediately to the
SERB. 3 47 The employer cannot file for any further equitable relief in this situation.
Only if the SERB finds clear and present danger, and only after its order is presented
336. Courts have had inherent equitable authority to restrain violations of state law, including those under chapter
4117 of the Revised Code. See Goldberg v. City of Cincinnati, 26 Ohio St. 2d 228, 271 N.E.2d 284 (1971).
337. OHIO REv. CODE § 4117.16(A).
338. Id. Only "if" the SERB makes the finding that a clear and present danger exists will the court have jurisdiction
to grant equitable relief.
339. Id.
340. Primary jurisdiction is the doctrine which holds that when a court and an agency each would be competent to
consider a matter, the court should defer to the agency the first determination of a specialized factual question. Thereafter,
the court will consider the matter. United States v. western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956). See also Sovern, Section 301
and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HARV. L. REv. 529 (1963). It may take several years for the SERB to
acquire close familiarity with the decisional factors that are commonly urged by administrative agencies as reasons for the
courts to defer to the primary jurisdiction of the SERB. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 100, §§ 168-169, at 487-91.
341. Though the courts have exclusive control over thejudicial power of the state, OHto Cois-r. art. IV, § 1, and the
legislature cannot impair the judicial authority, the legislature can define the jurisdiction of common pleas courts within
certain constitutional limits. Schario v. State, 105 Ohio St. 535, 138 N.E. 63 (1922); 16 0. JuR. 3d Constitutional Lais
§§ 317, 319 (1979).
342. OHto CoNsT. art. IV, § 1 does not have the case or controversy requirement that appears in U.S. CONST. art.
Ill.
343. Schario v. State, 105 Ohio St. 535, 138 N.E. 63 (1922).
344. OHIO REv. CODE § 4117.14(D)(2).
345. Id.; see also id. § 4117.16(A).
346. Id. § 4117.16(A).
347. Id.
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to the court by the Attorney General, or his or her representative, will the court have
jurisdiction to handle further requests for injunctive relief.348
Evidence of a clear and present danger may exist, but the court would be limited
to hearing what the statutory parties are willing to present. 349 Here an ambiguity
exists about the identity of the parties. It appears in section 4117.16(A) that the SERB
determination is presented to the court by counsel from the Attorney General's office,
which makes sense since the nature of the authority being invoked is a state agency's
adjudication. 35 0 The authority of the real party in interest, the employer, is not the
legal subject matter of the action after the seventy-two hour period has passed.351 If
one presumes that the Attorney General's staff can be present in each county on short
notice, this system will work.
An alternate reading requires the employer to ask the court for relief, using the
SERB finding as a premise for the employer's suit. 352 For reasons of economy and
speed, the court likely will read the ambiguity in favor of an employer's counsel
presenting the SERB findings to the court. Overall, the statutory scheme has so
clearly centralized the functions of policing the Act, focusing powers on the SERB to
execute its own orders, that one can argue that the local employer is divested of its
status as a party once the SERB comes on the scene, and that local enforcement of
SERB orders would constitute a discontinuity in an otherwise central construct.353
The 1975 version, from which the final act evolved, would have required the em-
ployer to ask the SERB to seek the injunctive relief.354 The ambiguity remains to be
decided.
Timing is clearly of the essence, for the temporary restraining order cannot last
more than three days, and the SERB injunction cannot last more than an additional
sixty days. 355 The statute is not clear whether intervenors can enter appearances in
these special equity proceedings; if the courts construe them as statutory proceedings
with defined parties, taxpayers or persons with another interest may find themselves
limited to an amicus role.
356
Strike litigation places an enormous burden on the administration of the SERB
and necessitates decentralization of litigation decisions to the SERB regional di-
rectors.357 Training, written policies, and communication will be critical needs. Here
348. Id.; see id. § 4117.02(G), regarding the Attorney General's authority to represent the SERB in court.
349. Id. § 4117.16(A).
350. The res of the dispute is the decision of the state administrative body; the role of the representative in court, the
Attorney General, is to defend the position of the body that made the order, not the position of the employer.
351. Onto REV. CODE § 4117.16(A).
352. Compare id. §§ 4117.13(A), .14(A), and .16(A), with former Ono REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.13(A) and
.14(A) (Page 1980), in which the employer is the equal of the SERB in seeking judicial relief. In Onto REV. CODE
§ 4117.16(A) (third paragraph) the employer's case terminates automatically 72 hours after relief has been granted. The
Board decision gives jurisdiction to the court to "issue orders to further enjoin the strike." An employer could argue that it
is the real party in interest and revive a lapsed temporary restraining order by a new proceeding for a preliminary
injunction.
353. For example, the employer could not settle an injunction action brought by the state against a union's unfair
labor practice, for the settlement would not uphold the authority of the SERB to enforce its orders.
354. Sub. S.B. 70, 11 1th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. (1975) (proposed Onto REv. CODE § 4117.15(A)).
355. Onto REV. CODE § 4117.16(A).
356. Intervention is not provided for in the statute and may be a matter for further development under the civil rules.
357. Area officials are part of the SERB structure. Id. § 4117.02(E). The SERB's attorneys will be members of the
Attorney General's staff or appointees of the Attorney General.
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again, representation by the Attorney General was a politically expedient matter, but
not necessarily administratively sound.35 8
During an injunction against a lawful but dangerous strike, the SERB mediator
will continue to work with the parties in an effort to reach an agreement. 359 Employ-
ers will probably go immediately to the SERB for a declaration that the strike is
unlawful if there are grounds for that argument. 3
60
An injunction against an unlawful strike is the second channel for judicial relief
from strikes. A strike by safety forces is clearly illegal. 36 1 Presumably, routine equity
proceedings alleging a violation of chapter 4117 will be brought against the strikers,
and court orders will be issued. 362 Unlike the 1975 and 1977 bills, which required
injunctive actions to be brought against striking safety force employees, the 1983
language is permissive. 363 The existence of an employer unfair labor practice is not a
valid defense. 364 One can forecast a future argument that prohibitions against strikes
by non-safety workers such as retirement office clerks, who were cast as "safety"
workers for purposes of the Act, are unreasonable and lack an adequate statutory
basis. 365 That statutory basis will be examined closely by the courts, and inclusion of
a subcategory that is obviously unrelated to safety may jeopardize the state's ability to
defend the category in the courts. When the final offer settlement procedure has been
used skillfully, there should be no economic reason for the union to strike. Numerous
other means of pressuring an employer are contained in the Act.3 6 6
A strike also is unlawful if it occurs during the contract term or during statutory
settlement procedures. 367 The Act prohibits those strikes, and general equity relief is
to be available. 368 If an unfair labor practice charge is made simultaneously, the
SERB may seek injunctive relief against the errant party.369
Practical responses to a strike are likely to be diverse. Replacement workers
could be hired, but the tone of the statute suggests that they will not be permanent. 370
358. Id. The section was amended during the last stages of House passage to eliminate the Board's power to
represent itself in court-an exceptional authority enjoyed by the federal agency, the National Labor Relations Board.
359. Id. § 4117.16(B).
360. Id. § 4117.23.
361. Id. § 4117.14(D)(1).
362. Id. § 4117.15(A).
363. Compare id. ("may seek an injunction") with Sub. S.B. 70, 11 1th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. (1975), and Sub.
S.B. 222, 112th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. (1977) ("shall" seek).
364. OHto REv. CODE § 4117.15(B). It may be a defense in a proceeding to fine or discipline the workers, however,
once the administrative remedies are invoked under § 4117.23(B).
365. Id. § 4117.14(D). The inclusion of the clerks is a mystery of legislative history, perhaps explained by the
political power of retired workers whose interest in continued receipt of payments was heard by the creators of this very
late House floor amendment.
366. Publicity, media attention to the fact finder's report, and a desire to work together in harmony are all reasons
why an elected official might see the wisdom of the union's position.
367. Omo REv. CODE § 4117.15(A).
368. Id.; see also id. § 4117.23.
369. Id. § 4117.13(A). The charging party may not bring the injunctive action until after the SERB has ruled on the
charge of unfair labor practices at the administrative hearing level and affirmed the charge at the Board level.
370. Testimony of Frank Stewart Before the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee, Apr. 6, 1983. Query if a
union can win an unfair practice "coercion" charge premised on such replacement action by the public employer. See
Onto REv. CODE § 4117.11(A)(1).
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The employer cannot lock out employees, 37 1 and it may have to take back employees
with no penalty against them if (1) it failed to follow the proper penalty procedures
against strikers, or (2) the SERB concludes that the employer provoked the strike. 372
Finally, none of the statutory relief provisions are self-executing: they require
judicial enforcement. Some judges, however, who are sensitive to public employees'
power, may be more reluctant than the SERB to block a strike. 373 On the other hand,
the new relief provisions may allow judges to utilize their powers of equity to produce
injunctive relief that is stronger than the statutory remedies.
VI. GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES
The Ohio law favors grievance arbitration, but stops short of requiring manda-
tory arbitration of grievances. Some grievance procedures must be included in every
agreement.3 74 The agreed upon procedure "may" culminate in final and binding
arbitration of both grievances and the interpretations of the contract. Neither the bill
as passed, nor the prior versions since 1975, 375 compelled the inclusion of mandatory
arbitration of grievances, as states such as Pennsylvania have done; but each version
of the Ohio bill has required that some grievance resolution system be accepted by the
parties.
Opponents of the bill argued against the scope of the required grievance pro-
cedures, for the grievance system can be used to interpret the contract and also to
resolve an open-ended set of grievances. 376 The law requires certain matters to be
included in the contract, and the inclusion of some grievance procedure to interpret
those matters makes sense. It was argued, however, that arbitrators might overreach
their powers and reconstruct obligations under the contract through the grievance
process.377 The potential reconstruction of management rights issues through griev-
ance procedures would probably be one of the grounds cited by employers for refus-
ing to agree to contract clauses that require grievances to be submitted to binding
arbitration.
371. Onto REv. CODE § 4117.1 l(A)(7). Stewart was very critical of this change. "'Public employers should be
entitled to no less than their private counterparts." Testimony of Frank Stewart Before the Senate Commerce and Labor
Committee, Apr. 6, 1983.
372. Onto REv. CODE § 4117.23.
373. The court has jurisdiction to enter an injunction it considers proper; the Board "may" ask for relief; the
employer "may" ask for relief. See id. § 4117.13. None of these compels the taking of the action or the granting of the
injunction. It would be naive to ignore the realities of reelection as a factor in this equation of discretionary actions.
374. Id. § 4117.09(B)(1). It can be argued that an implicit trade off occurs when a no-strike provision is included in
a contract; grievance arbitration should be mandatory because the sides should make equal concessions in the contract. But
the Act, on its face, is not a mandate for arbitration of grievances. Interview with Dennis Morgan, Counsel to Com-
munications Workers Union, June 6, 1983.
375. Sub. S.B. 70, 11th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. (1975); Sub. S.B. 222, 112th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. (1977).
376. "S.B. 133 gives SERB unwarranted control not only of the bargaining process, but of the bargain itself. This
goes far beyond the authority given the NLRB in the federal area .... [U]nions and employers have long recognized that
arbitration is best confined to the application and interpretation of the expressed terms of the agreement itself-and no
more." Testimony of Frank Stewart Before the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee, Apr. 6, 1983. Stewart noted the
open-endedness of using the arbitration to decide "unresolved grievances and disputed interpretations," where no limit
was placed on which grievances could be arbitrated. Id.
377. Lewis Interview, supra note 65. Mr. Lewis used the example of class size, a matter which, in the past, has been
classified as managerial, but may now be the subject of a grievance. The matter is not necessarily contractual, but the
grievance arbitrator under § 4117.09(B)(1) is not limited to interpreting contracts.
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Creative alternatives for the grievance settlement process can be worked out by
the parties. Compared to that of other states, Ohio's grievance mechanism is rela-
tively progressive. Pennsylvania's grievance procedures differ from Ohio's in two
respects; no definite requirement for contractual grievance procedures is included in
the statute, and all grievance disputes must go to compulsory arbitration. 378 The
grievance settlement cannot be inconsistent with state law. 3 7 9 In Michigan the state
commission mediates grievances, and arbitration is not compulstory. 380 Grievance
arbitration is expressly forbidden for safety forces such as fire fighters. 38 1 New York
encourages the parties to voluntarily adopt a binding arbitration of their grievances.
The state board has a set of procedures and a list of acceptable arbitrators to be used
for grievance cases. 382 California law permits grievances and unfair labor practice
charges to be filed together. The charges will proceed without deferral if the party
convinces the state board that it would be futile to follow the grievance steps.383
Should the SERB and the Ohio courts defer processing a potential unfair labor
practice charge when a matter could be taken to grievance arbitration? The doctrine of
deferral to voluntary arbitration has strong roots in other states 384 and the federal
system. 38 5 In states that have had arbitration for years, deferral to arbitration is
strong, except when a statute forbids the redelegation of an issue to an arbitrator 386 or
when a constitutional barrier to delegation exists. 387 The federal deferral doctrine is
applied in the much more voluntary setting of private contractual grievance settle-
ment. It may or may not be applied in Ohio. Ohio*. deadlines leave so little time for
action that deferral may contravene the statutory requirement. 388 The model of the
federal exception to deferral, the pursuit of unfair labor practice matters that relate to
the protection of employee rights, would seem to weih in favor of creating a
comparable exception to the SERB process.
If a final and binding grievance procedure is contained in an existing contract,
whether it involves arbitration or not, section 4117.10 removes the jurisdiction of the
prior state boards of personnel and civil service review. 3 89 There can be no election of
378. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.903 (Purdon Supp. 1965-1982).
379. Id.; see also Community College v. Community College of Beaver County Society of Faculty, 473 Pa. 576,
375 A.2d 1267 (1977).
380. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.207 (West 1978).
381. Id. § 423.233.
382. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 207 (1969).
383. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3514.5(a), 3541.5(a) (West 1980).
384. See, e.g., Cowden, Deferral to Arbitration by the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 80 DICK. L. REv. 666
(1976). Deferral acceptance is not universal, however. See Detroit Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 344 v. City of Detroit, 408
Mich. 663, 293 N.W.2d 278 (1980).
385. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
386. In re Port Jefferson Station Teachers Ass'n, Inc. v. Brookhaven-Comsewogue Union Free School Dist., 45
N.Y.2d 898, 383 N.E.2d 553,411 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1978); In re Willink v. Webster Teachers Ass'n, 81 A.D.2d 1008, 440
N.Y.S.2d 100 (1981).
387. Detroit Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 344 v. City of Detroit, 408 Mich. 663, 293 N.W.2d 278 (1980).
388. The period in which the SERB can act on an unfair labor practice charge is so short that deferral may be outside
the legislative intent. See OHIo REv. CODE § 4117.12(B). The SERB will need to vindicate its authority during its early
years. By analogy, the NLRB's power to uphold its authority through unfair labor practice cases cannot be compromised
by private settlements. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976); Walt Disney Prods. -v. NLRB, 146 F.2d 44, 48 (9th Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 324 U.S. 877 (1945). Deferral is not used by the NLRB when the allegations affect individual rights. General Am.
Transp. Corp., 228 NLRB 808 (1977), discussed in Case Note, 1978 S. ILL. U. L.J. 98.
389. OHIo REv. CODE § 4117.10(A).
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remedies to take the disagreement through the personnel board, if the matter would be
subject to a grievance procedure. 390 The personnel board was made a part of the
SERB, with limited jurisdiction,39 ' and it may be phased out by subsequent legisla-
tion once the impact of the SERB has been assessed. Although the new Act's changes
affect state civil service employees, some charter cities will continue to maintain their
own civil service arrangements under home rule authority.
Employee organizations are likely to press vigorously for binding arbitration of
grievances. Proponents argued that the no-strike provision during the term of the
contract was a necessary trade off for a binding arbitration agreement on the employ-
er's part, and since it was a quid pro quo, employers should agree to mandatory
inclusion of the binding arbitration provision.
392
Concerning grievances, a potential pitfall for employers is the treatment of
management rights issues in section 4117.08;393 though a matter of management
rights, such as the use of technology, need not be a subject of bargaining during
contract negotiations, 39 4 if it is legitimately within the statutory categories reserved to
management, the same matter can be the subject of a grievance "based on the
collective bargaining agreement. " 395 During the legislative development, employers
feared that unions would use binding arbitration to expand the unions' rights and
erode management prerogatives. 396 This may be an infrequent occurrence, but no
clear pattern will be visible for a time.
VII. RESOLUTION OF INTERUNION DISPUTES
Although the collective bargaining bill was vigorously promoted by each of the
public sector unions, each member of the successful coalition knew that the passage
of the bill would trigger vigorous contests for the organization of public
employees.3 97 The SERB will have problems in the context of interunion disputes,
which will center upon unit determinations, representation elections, and jurisdic-
tional work disputes.
The first disagreement among representatives may come when the SERB makes
its earliest unit determinations. The larger the unit, the more likely will be competi-
tion among unions. Negotiating with one rather than a dozen unions may be desired
by the employer, but the sympathies of the workers in the unit may be divided along
390. Id.
391. 1983 Ohio Laws 140, § 1 (amending Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 124.05 (Page 1978)).
392. Interview with Dennis Morgan, Counsel to the Communications Workers Union, July 23, 1983.
393. See Onto REV. CODE § 4117.08(C).
394. Id. § 4117.08(C)(1).
395. Id. § 4117.08(C).
396. Lewis interview, supra note 65; Legislative Policy Statement, Coalition of Public Employers, Administrators,
and Taxpayers (May 10, 1983). Cincinnati's Norman Murdock warned that the bill "put the coffers [of local government]
up for grabs," and that the SERB would be above all local authorities and above the courts. Local Officials Assail Public
Employee Bargaining Proposal, 56 Gongwer Ohio Report, Mar. 29, 1983, at 4.
397. Opponents were exceptionally colorful in attacking this aspect of interunion attention during the drive to enact
the bill. "(N)obody wants [S.B. 133] except some of the public employees, all of the public employee union officials and
a few of the politicians they helped elect. Senate Bill 133 hasn't even been voted on yet and already the various public
employee labor unions are starting to fight amongst themselves ..... The union bosses are already starting to behave like
pigs at the trough." Testimony of John Stewart, Ohio Information Commttee, Before the Senate Commerce and Labor
Committee, Mar. 29, 1983.
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craft or historical lines. The craft unions, such as state carpenters, obtained a last
minute amendment to the bill that protected craft union units from SERB de-
terminations during a transition period. 398 Any substantial adverse decision that a
union wishes to appeal from the nonreviewable SERB unit determinations will prob-
ably follow the craft union example and be sought as a legislated change to the
collective bargaining law. This is unwise as a matter of administrative procedure for
it balkanizes the administrative scheme and reduces predictability. But that is the
price of making important adjudicative decisions nonreviewable. 399
The election of a representative among several competing unions, during the
"window" of election time, 400 is an important challenge to the flexibility and com-
petence of the SERB. The SERB should be sufficiently respected and neutral to
conduct a fair election with few appeals to the courts. The SERB will be best served
by cautious neutrality in elections and vigilance concerning the impact of its unit
determinations on election results.
Election procedures will probably be modeled upon NLRB models. Where none
of the optional parties receives a majority, a runoff election will be held, 4 1 for which
the campaigning may be very vigorous. Prior to the certification of the union, it is an
unfair labor practice for that union or any representative to attempt to coerce the
employer into recognizing the union. 40 2 An employer can use the typical unfair labor
practices remedies in such an instance.40
3
If the employer deals with three different unions at three or more locations where
the same type of work is performed, it may be expected that multiunit bargaining
would be favored by the employer, but disfavored by the unions. 4 4 Interunion
disagreements concerning the multiunit approach may involve the SERB in some
controversies for which no acceptable, mutual settlement is possible.
Jurisdictional work disputes merit rapid attention from the SERB. Picketing or
other aggressive actions are forbidden.40 5 If two unions disagree about proper work
assignments, the SERB will rapidly decide the dispute. After ten days of interunion
settlement effort, the dispute must go to a SERB hearing. 40 6
VIII. ADJUDICATION OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
In the labor field an administrative agency cannot rely on rules and procedures
alone. The decisions reached by the agency that concern unfair practices form the
398. 1983 Ohio Laws 140, § 4(E).
399. Because unit designations are not reviewable in the courts, OHIo REV. CODE § 4117.06(A), the legislature may
act to reverse SERB unit designations by attaching rider clauses to other legislation.
400. This 30-day filing period is set out in id. § 4117.07(C)(6).
401. The runoff election includes only the top two choices from the first election. Id. § 4117.07(C)(5).
402. Id. § 4117.11(B)(5).
403. Id. §§ 4117.12-.13.
404. Id. § 4117.06(D). Pennsylvania likewise allows multiunit bargaining, 43 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1101.604(4)
(Purdon Supp. 1965-1982).
405. Oflo REV. CODE § 4117.1 l(B)(4). Some of the criteria for the SERB's precedents will be found in NLRB
decisions, like International Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge No. 1743, 135 NLRB 1402 (1962).
406. OHIo REV. CODE § 4117.1 (D). The sense of the exclusion is that settlement power is held by the Board, not
the parties, after that date. NLRB v. Plasterers' Local Union No. 79, 404 U.S. 116 (1971).
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precedential case law under which the agency operates. Ohio's SERB will use the
unfair labor practice procedures to assert control over both employers and unions.
One can predict that the process will not be easy, and that court enforcement and
defenses will be a growth area for litigation in the Board's first years.
4 0 7
The Ohio procedure for handling unfair labor practice charges is almost identical
to that of the National Labor Relations Board. 40 8 But the Ohio SERB does not have
the separation of roles that, in the federal statutory scheme, isolates prosecutorial
discretion to bring an unfair practices complaint from the adjudicatory power to
decide the merits of the complaint. These are the isolated roles that the "separation of
functions" principle embodies in administrative law409 and that Congress has applied
to federal structures for handling labor relations issues.4 10 The SERB could be at-
tacked for bias in its mixed organizational roles. But in its daily operation the SERB
is directed to keep the individuals who actually hear cases separated from those who
hear appeals. 4 1' It may be that the federal system is superior, but it developed over a
longer period and with a more reliable budget. The same separation of powers may
evolve in Ohio, but, for the initial years, the charge of institutional conflicts of
interest among the several roles is inevitable.
Both the statutory terms used to list unfair labor practices and the procedures for
hearings are rather unremarkable.412 Where federal case law in the private sector is
not instructive, case law from Michigan, Pennsylvania and other states may illumi-
nate the meanings of the statutory prohibitions. 41 3 Two specific unfair labor practice
categories were criticized as unfair to employers: the public employer cannot lock out
employees to force a resolution of a lingering dispute,4 14 and the employer can be
charged with attempting to cause a union to commit an unfair labor practice against
407. Section 4117.12 will be an important source of litigation in particular, and it is very likely that early tests of
SERB injunctive relief powers against unfair labor practices will arise. See OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.12(C). The extent to
which the courts defer to the SERB while it develops expertise in labor relations will be a source of great controversy.
During legislative hearings the need for a "new and inexperienced board" to adopt broad policies was challenged. See
Testimony of Frank Stewart Before the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee, Apr. 6, 1983. Questions of deference
are discussed supra in subpart IV(B) and infra in part X.
408. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976). For discussions of unfair labor practices, see also D. McDOWELL & K. HUHN,
NLRB RFESrEoEs FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTCES (1976); Nolan & Lehr, Improving NLRB Unfair Labor Practice
Procedures, 57 Tux. L. REV. 47 (1978).
409. The separation of functions doctrine is premised on the due process argument that one cannot be both
investigator and judge; but constitutional application of the principle is limited. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35
(1975); FiC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
410. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976). A combination of roles so interrelated gives rise to systemic bias, whether or
not an individual bias develops. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 100, § I 11, at 322. With its study and reporting
roles as well, the SERB will need to exercise special care. See, e.g., Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FrC, 577 F.2d 1368 (9th
Cir. 1978).
411. The SERB combines investigation, complaint, adjudication, litigation, penalty, and educational roles in three
persons comprising the Board. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.02.
412. Id. §§ 4711.11-.12.
413. Drafters of the bill relied on Pennsylvania and Michigan as primary models. Populous states, such as New
York, have developed ample case law in the area. See Gagliardo, Is Looking Up Case Precedent in Other Jurisdictions
Worthwhile in Public Sector Labor Relations: A Union Perspective, 6 J. LAW & EDUC. 215 (1977).
414. Id. § 4117.1 I(A)(7). A lockout has been defined as quitting work when the employer's actions leave "'no
alternative for [workers] but to leave their work"'; the test is whether the conditions set by the employer are "'such that
the employees could not reasonably be expected to accept them."' Zanesville Rapid Transit, Inc. v. Bailey, 168 Ohio St.
351, 355. 155 N.E.2d 202, 205-06 (1958) (quoting Almada v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 137
Conn. 380, 77 A.2d 765 (1951)).
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the employer.4 15 The first is not normal in state collective bargaining laws;4 6 the
second is likely to be hotly contested, for the process of proving that an employer
"caused" a union to violate section 4117.11 may be circular and complex.
An unfair labor practice may cause injury to persons other than the union or the
employer, such as persons whose business is affected by a sudden strike for which no
advance notice was given. The statute allows only the employer and the union to seek
damages against the party who committed the unfair labor practice. 4 17 Others must
seek general judicial relief without the benefit of the statutory remedy. A strike that is
unlawful, such as a strike by a fire fighters' union, might be held to be an unfair labor
practice, but it is not expressly included in the list of prohibited actions in section
4117.1 1.4 18
Finally, the union bears a duty of fair representation to all public employees in
the unit, whether members or not-a duty which can be pursued through SERB unfair
practice proceedings. 4 19 Fair representation has produced much litigation.420 Ada-
mant opponents of the compulsory union membership or fees provisions may be a
source of breach of fair representation actions, as Ohio's case law develops in parallel
with the federal case law on the subject. 42'
IX. OPEN QUESTIONS ON THE NEw AGENCY'S AGENDA
A. In General
The early years of administering the Act will require the SERB to address a
multitude of problems and to utilize the full range of the SERB members' skills. The
size and shape of local and state employee units, and the degree of centralization of
those units within state agencies, cities or districts, will be an early and vital question.
The legislature delegated a great deal of power, with some politically necessary
415. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.11(A)(8).
416. For example, it is not an unfair labor practice for an employer to lock out strikers under the Pennsylvania statute
that served as an example for the earlier versions of the Ohio collective bargaining bill. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1101. 1201 (Purdon Supp. 1965-1982); Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Mars Area School Dist., 480 Pa. 295, 389
A.2d 1073 (1978). See MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 423.210 (West 1978). New York requires that the contract be
continued, which may be an implicit barrier to a lockout strategy. N.Y. Ctv. SEtv. LAW § 209-a(l)(e) (McKinney 1983).
417. OHto REV. CODE § 4117.11(A)-(C).
418. A strike is not an unfair labor practice under Ohio law, id. § 4117.11, but it may be under the law of other
states. See, e.g., 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.120(6) (Purdon Supp. 1965-1982).
419. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.11(B)(6).
420. See, e.g., Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight. 424
U.S. 554 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
421. One interesting aspect of the bill is that the persons who pay fees to the exclusive representative must be fairly
represented by the union, whether they are members or not. Any vote on a proposed agreement is for the union
"membership" only. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.14(C)(6). A future fair representation struggle may begin when the SERB
adopts "rules governing the procedures and methods for public employees to vote on the recommendations of the fact
finding panel." Id. Public employees may be covered by the procedures even if they are not union members. Query
whether dissenting nonmenbers must be given an opportunity to vote, as a duty of the exclusive representation. The
current case law does not speak to the issue. See. e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). There is
room, however, for future court debates, in which nonmembers can be heard. Under Abood the nonmember financial
arrangement in § 4117.09(C) is likely to be upheld; but the fate of nonmember settlement participation remains an open
issue.
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exceptions to protect craft and other unions.4 22 The SERB will be closely watched as
it sets the units in place. The SERB cannot take the second step, representation
elections, until this unit step is completed. 423 Nonreviewability and lack of an over-
sight body leave the SERB on its own in choosing a strategy for unit decisions.
New York opted for large units; its Governor set the larger unit size and over-
rode a state board similar to the SERB when that board challenged the unit determina-
tion. The vague New York criteria were easily met by the Governor's determination,
and the new statutory board received less deference from that state's highest court
than did the Governor.424 Disputes over unit size occasionally have been heard from
New York, and the courts, over time, have become more deferential.42 5 Pennsylvania
has used a community of interest test, comparable to that which the SERB will
utilize, that is designed to avoid overfragmentation.4 26 An Ohio witness warned that
fragmentation had occurred at the federal level, despite contrary congressional di-
rectives, and that Ohio should heed the warning and adopt a judicial review provision
on unit determinations. 427 Federal courts have been able to reverse the NLRB on this
issue.428 Michigan, another model state for Ohio's new law, merely references in its
statute the standard language for all labor unit determinations, the effect of which is
to approve plant-specific units or historically recognized units.429
Delegation of authority remains an open issue. Increases in taxes may be re-
quired because of arbitrators' decisions, the law's opponents charged, and therefore
the bill delegates too much governmental power. 430 The courts will have to resolve
the open question of how the final offer settlement procedure will be enforced. The
conciliator's award must be implemented by the legislative body of the public
employer. If that body lacks sufficient taxing authority, this lack should be com-
422. Otno REv. CODE § 4117.06(A) gives exclusive and unreviewable jurisdiction to the SERB, but § 4(E) of the
law as enacted, 1983 Ohio Laws 140, forbids alteration of existing craft units by the SERB.
423. OHto REV. CODE § 4117.07(A).
424. New York's selection of units was made by the Governor, and the Board in that situation did not agree; the
highest court of the state upheld the Governor's selection over the Board. In re Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Helsby, 25
N.Y.2d 842, 250 N.E.2d 731, 303 N.Y.S.2d 690 (1969). Because Ohio's scheme is much more tightly drafted in favor of
the Board and against executive power than was New York's, the foregoing situation will not occur in Ohio.
425. New York courts are more deferential to the Board than Ohio's substantial evidence test appears to allow. A
test related to arbitrariness was applied in New York Board decisions. See In re Jefferson County Bd. of Supervisors v.
New York State Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 36 N.Y.2d 534, 330 N.E.2d 621, 369 N.Y.S.2d (1975); Bivins v.
Helsby, 55 A.D.2d 230, 389 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1976).
426. Pennsylvania's "community of interest" statutory requirement is found at 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1101.604(l)(i) (Purdon Supp. 1965-1982).
427. The SERB could, it was said. "ignore the will of the legislature or [more likely] merely give it lip service" in
making its unit determinations. Testimony of Frank Stewart Before the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee, Apr. 6,
1983.
428. See, e.g., NLRB v. Frederick Memorial Hosp. Inc., 691 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. HMO Int'l/Cal.
Medical Group Health Plan, Inc., 678 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1982).
429. Mitc. CosP. LAWs ANN. § 423.9e (West 1978); Hillsdale Community Schools v. Michigan Labor Mediation
Bd., 24 Mich. App. 36, 179 N.W.2d 661 (1970).
430. Opponents charged that arbitrators would be able to raise taxes. Testimony of John Stewart, Ohio Information
Committee, Before the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee, Mar. 29, 1983; Legislative Policy Statement, Coalition
of Public Employers, Administrators, and Taxpayers (May 10, 1983). Opponents also argued that the state took away
local controls without taking on responsibility for the consequences of increased costs. Collective Bargaining Faces One
Last Hurdle After Winning House Approval, 56 Gongwer Ohio Report, June 30, 1983, at 1.
431. In the sponsor's press statement introducing the 1983 bill, an attached exhibit stated: "Approval of Settlement
Requiring Appropriation of Money Must Be Approved by Legislative Authority." Press Release of Senator Eugene
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municated to the conciliator, and the binding process may be challenged. A public
employer might argue that the conciliator's award is void because he or she exceeded
powers in failing to confine the award to the potential revenues available.
4 32
In retrospect, the unions erred. The binding settlement process was exposed to
significant jeopardy when the original 1975 text regarding review of the arbitrator's
award was changed4 33 to its final text, which cross-references chapter 2711 of the
Revised Code-the statutory procedure for review of commercial arbitration awards.
The employer who refuses to honor an award that raises local taxes may get a local
jury to decide the challenge to the award.434 The jury system is a noble instrument,
but the opportunity to refuse to raise one's local taxes may be too high a temptation.
This procedural route for enforcement is a risk for the union to take only after its
victory with the conciliator.
The conscious inclusion of chapter 2711 in the final Act as the point of reference
for conciliation review means that the conflict of enforcement or modification will be
fought out under commercial arbitration procedures. Proponents felt that other
arbitrations already conducted under chapter 2711 would give some precedential
guidance to the courts. Noting that the chapter 2711 procedures allow jury decisions
when a party refuses to perform, proponents asserted that in most cases the judge
alone would decide the matter since both sides went through the arbitration process.
Of course, if an unpopular binding order is subject to jury reversal, the finality of
arbitration awards may be in some jeopardy.435
Grievances based on technology replacing workers are likely to increase. Man-
agement is, on the one hand, subject to grievances for changes in work conditions,
and on the other hand, is able to decide "inherent management policy" matters, such
as utilization of technology and the adequacy of the work force.43 6
Public employment labor relations law is full of constitutional quicksand.4 37 The
right of an employee to criticize a teacher's union at a public meeting of the employer
is an example of constitutionally protected speech. 438 The right of the union to collect
agency shop fees for services to nonmembers is also constitutionally established. 439
Can the city or the union penalize a dissident member who criticizes the good faith of
Branstool on Introduction of S.B. 133 (Mar. 18, 1983). This refers, in the Act, only to the fact-finding stage of approval,
OHIo REv. CODE § 4117.14(C)(6), and not to the end product of the conciliation. Id. § 4117.14(l).
432. Oto Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2711.10(D) (Page 1981).
433. Sub. S.B. 70, 111 th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. (1975), had more limited criteria forjudicial review in proposed
§ 4117.14(E).
434. A jury may be used if the city refuses to arbitrate. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.03 (Page 1981). "If
the ... failure to perform [an arbitration award] is in issue ... either party may ... demand a jury trial of such
issue .... If the jury finds... there is a default in proceeding ... the court shall make an order summarily directing the
parties to proceed with the arbitration." Id. If two parties go through the conciliation process and one then refuses to
accept the award, the court decides the question of vacating the award. Id. § 2711.10.
435. Most conciliation awards simply will be reviewed by the court under § 2711.10 of the Revised Code, because
there usually will be a finished arbitration award rather than a default in the proceeding that would invoke § 2711.03 and
potential jury review.
436. Onto REv. CODE § 4117.08(C).
437. Constitutional issues involving public employee rights arise quite frequently, and several have reached the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976);
and Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
438. Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 429 U.S. 167 (1977).
439. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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the employer's agreement with the union? Do libel laws and unfair labor practices
intersect, as they do in the private sector?440 To repeat an earlier example, do police
sergeants have a constitutional freedom of association that the Ohio law unreasonably
infringes?44' And since Ohio omitted the commonplace reservation of free speech
rights during bargaining, found in federal and other states' laws, 4 42 do Ohio public
employers have fewer protections than the private employers located next door to city
hall?
One can argue that too much tinkering occurred with some sections, such as the
"supervisor" definition' 3 and the inclusion of retirement clerks as safety forces
prohibited from striking,'" to the extent that the legislature diminished the credibility
of the statutory classifications. If and when a classification is challenged, the SERB
will need deference from the courts.
The ultimate question is the extent to which Ohio courts, unaccustomed to such
large powers as those vested in the SERB, will defer to the new agency. A court that
is asked to defer to the statutory scheme may, in some cases, find that very scheme
difficult to follow amid its negotiated exceptions. The SERB is certain to ask for
judicial deference, but its members are not omniscient. 44 5 The SERB will be only as
good as its members and the people who appear before it as advocates. The SERB's
duty is to be wise and prudent amidst competing claims of equal merit. If it succeeds
in winning judicial deference in more cases than those in which it loses deference, it
will be a relative success.
B. Conflicts Benveen Labor Agreements and Prior Laws
One late addition to the collective bargaining bill, as it moved through the
legislature in 1983, had great symbolic significance. Ohio's State Personnel Board of
Review was reconstituted as a subunit of the SERB.446 The civil service powers
were, at least symbolically, subordinated to the new authority of the employers and
unions as they engaged in collective bargaining. Another provision of the Act makes
SERB-sanctioned grievance resolution procedures predominant over state personnel
remedies.447 By the time of the June 1983 amendment, any doubt about the complete
transition to the supremacy of collective bargaining in Ohio had ended.
The collective bargaining bill was not written on a clean slate, of course, for
440. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 2161 (1983).
441. OHto REV. CODE § 4117.06(D)(6) prohibits police sergeants from being members of the department-wide
bargaining unit and from being classed as "supervisors." Thus, small units of sergeants will be nonexempt and will have
less bargaining leverage than their lower-ranked colleagues. A contrary Michigan practice permits joint sergeant-police-
officer units. See City of Escanaba v. Michigan Labor Mediation Bd., 19 Mich. App. 273, 172 N.W.2d 836 (1969).
442. Absent coercion or threats, no oral statement can be made the basis for an unfair labor practice charge under the
federal scheme. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976).
443. OHto REv. CODE § 4117.01(F) (Note: the expanded definitional section becomes effective on April 1, 1984).
444. Id. § 4117.14(D)(1).
445. The law only requires that members have a certain political affiliation and that the members be "knowledge-
able" about either labor relations or personnel practices. Oito REv. CODE § 4117.02(A). Deference by the courts to the
SERB is likely to be earned rather than given. New York experienced the same learning curve. See In re Civil Serv.
Employees Ass'n v. Helsby, 25 N.Y.2d 842, 250 N.E.2d 731, 303 N.Y.S.2d 690 (1969).
446. OHIto REv. CODE § 4117.02(N).
447. Id. § 4117.10(A).
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cities and state employer agencies have enacted legislation on employee benefits that
opponents of the new legislation cited as examples of existing protection and privi-
lege for public employees. 4 8 These benefit laws are not preempted, and contract
drafting from the union side is unlikely to allow conflicts with these laws. 4 9 The bill
was seen as remedial in nature; public employee unions were concerned that state
legislation had not adequately protected worker rights.4 50 The collective bargaining
and grievance processes improved the administration of the state, it was argued, and
conflicts would be reduced. 45 1 The latter arguments had the votes to prevail.
Though the new Act provides that a collective bargaining contract overrides
inconsistent provisions of prior statutes or ordinances, 452 the various drafts of the bill
accumulated a lengthy set of exceptions that retained some existing laws. For ex-
ample, state affirmative action laws, laws concerning the residency of employees,
and the statutory minimum educational standards will not be alterable by contracts.
453
A state requirement on the financial soundness of a school district also remains
dominant over the collective bargaining law;4 54 whether a school district can pay
more in salaries than it can expect to raise in taxes may be an early focus of conflicts.
The state minima readily can be exceeded without any problems of statutory conflict,
and the employer can agree to pay more than the minimum workers compensation or
unemployment payments. 4
The statutory preeminence of prior law may mean more in the public sector than
it does in everyday private bargaining. The benefits of a private sector employee
would be jeopardized by contract expiration, but statutory imposition of the existing
set of Ohio public employee benefits is unaltered by the new collective bargaining
process. Benefits can be improved but not removed, absent some legislative
change.456
Eventually, if budget problems persist, the SERB may be called upon to perform
the politically deadly task of ruling on which benefit program reductions may be
made by general state appropriations legislation without further collective
bargaining.4 57 One could also foresee piecemeal amendments to the collective
448. In addition to a minimum salary schedule, it was asserted that other legislatively mandated or authorized
benefits for public workers included: sick leave, personal leave, maternity leave, tenure (civil service), vacation days,
holiday time, due process procedures, pharmaceutical insurance, full or partial employer-paid life insurance, assault
leave, professional leave, military leave, calamity leave, severance pay, retirement, automatic salary increases,
hospitalization insurance, and dental insurance. Ohio PTA, Legislative Policy Statement (Mar. 2, 1983).
449. It is expected that bargaining will begin with mandated benefits and proceed from there, filling in any
permissive benefits not yet provided by that employer. Such arrangements do not violate the Act. Omo REv. CODE
§ 4117.10(A).
450. Monroe Testimony, supra note 2.
451. Interview with Stewart Jaffy, General Counsel, Ohio AFL-CIO, June 13, 1983.
452. OHio REv. CODE § 4117.10(A).
453. Id.
454. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5705.41 (Page Supp. 1983).
455. See Onto REv. CODE § 4117.10(A).
456. A change in a statutory benefit would require legislation; but, as a mid-term change in a contracted benefit, it
might also be a bargainable matter.
457.The impact of public employer financial distress should be considered in union planning under the new law. In
New York budget deficit problems greatly affected the ability of public employee unions of benefit from arbitration. Fox.
Criteria for Public Sector Interest Arbitration in New York City: The Triumph of 'Ability to Pay' and the End of Interest
Arbitration, 46 ALB. L. REv. 97 (1981). Detroit's Mayor Coleman Young was quoted in Ohio testimony as saying that his
city's cost was $50 million per year, "and even more disastrous for Detroit, compulsory arbitration destroys sensible
fiscal management." Memo to the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee from J. Coleman, Ohio Municipal League,
Apr. 19, 1983.
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bargaining legislation installing special exceptions to the Act. Just as there was no
clean slate, there is no guarantee against erasures.
The ultimate battle that employee advocates of the new law must win is the
enforcement of a mandate to raise taxes in those infrequent situations in which a
binding order exceeds the budgetary ability of the local employer. This is a "must
win" conflict in the courts, one sure to attract amicus curiae briefs in the early test
cases. Compulsion to raise local taxes through injunctive relief is a feasible remedy in
the abstract, and it appears possible, though purposely vague, in the statute.458 Ohio
judges are also individual political figures, however, who must run for periodic
reelection. 4 59 A mandatory injunction is impossible without a judge willing to impose
one; while judges often have been willing to grant the relief, the statutory change may
change that propensity. Employees and unions must win when the fiscal realities of
enforcement emerge in a contested case.
The probable focus of such a fight will be the conciliation orders given in
situations in which safety force impasses have occurred or in which an employer, by
contract, has accepted the final offer settlement procedure for use with non-safety
workers. Other contract agreements can be rejected by the legislative body if sixty
percent or more of the voting members of that body choose to reject and reenter
negotiations, 4 6 0 but the conciliator's order is binding. Time will tell how the judiciary
responds to enforcement of an impasse-based final order, when tax increases are
sought to be imposed on a reluctant legislative body.
46 1
C. Oversight and Politics
Administrative bodies like the SERB need oversight. Structurally, the SERB is
independent of the executive branch of state government because it is a statutory
body, its managers are appointed by the SERB members, and the members are not
routinely subject to removal by the governor. The SERB's actions are final state
actions subject to no cabinet level or gubernatorial review. 462
The governor also cannot interfere with SERB actions without creating a major,
publicized conflict of interest; it was to his Department of Administrative Services
that the legislature attached the office which will represent state employer agencies
before the SERB.463 A governor may feel that the SERB is beyond needed political
control, but should hesitate to heal the problem through direct pressure. Whether
scandal would attach to such an attempt to influence the SERB, it can be supposed
458. A mandate to increase taxes possibly is included in the requirement to take "whatever actions are necessary to
implement the award." OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.14(t).
459. The legislature has given judges jurisdiction to review awards by conciliators. Id. § 4117.14(H); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2711. 10 (Page 1981). Ohio elects its judges, OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6, and electoral politics may be at least
an implicit factor in decisions on public employee cases.
460. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.14(C)(6).
461. Id. § 4117.14(1). When asked about the process, union counsel suggested that the employer would be likely to
test the enforcement of the arbitration award by refusing to pay, and the union then would move for enforcement of the
award under chapter 2711 of the Revised Code. Interview with Dennis Morgan, Counsel to the Communications Workers
Union, June 6, 1983. See In re Port Jefferson Teachers Ass'n, Inc. v. Brookhaven-Comsewogue Union Free School Dist.,
45 N.Y.2d 898, 383 N.E.2d 553, 411 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1978); Caso v. Coffey, 41 N.Y.2d 153, 359 N.E.2d 683, 391
N.Y.S.2d 88 (1976); Tate v. Antosh, 3 Pa. Commw. 144, 281 A.2d 192 (1971).
462. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.02(A).
463. Id. § 4117.10(D).
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that a prudent governor will wield only the indirect influence of new member appoint-
ments to the SERB.
Governors will, however, make personal decisions about the strategy to be used
in the office of collective bargaining. During an election year, the individual candi-
date for reelection as governor may find it difficult to withstand the pressure from a
very large and disciplined voting bloc comprised of public employees. The office of
collective bargaining will have to be carefully and diplomatically managed.
The Public Employment Advisory and Counseling Effort Commission (PEACE)
that was created by the new law will exist through 1986. It will have no power other
than to study and report on public labor relations,4 64 and it will have none of the clout
of the governor or legislators .465 Although it would be wise to obtain the insights of
the members of the commission, PEACE should avoid becoming another forum for
the same disputes debated in the legislature.
Legislative veto was a curious addition to the bill in late 1983.466 The curiosity
comes from the fact that the bill was passed after the United States Supreme Court
had held legislative veto unconstitutional at the federal level.4 67 Legislative veto is
likely to be invalidated in Ohio, too, assuming that constitutional doctrine in the state
and federal supreme courts is largely consistent. Thus, until a definitive invalidation,
rules governing fact-finding procedure adopted by the SERB in 1984 in response to
problems experienced in a strike could be vetoed by the legislature. 468 This is the
second veto provision in the bill, paired with the earlier power of the legislature to
veto state employee contract fact finder recommendations by a three-fifths vote.
With gubernatorial oversight unlikely, the study commission of tenuous power
and tenure, and the status of legislative veto in doubt, the only remaining threats to
SERB power are the traditional oversight hearings and amendments by the legisla-
ture. These are likely to be the primary political guideposts for determining how well
the new law is progressing. The legal guideposts will be set by the courts.
X. THE COURTS AND THE NEW STATUTE
Administrative lawyers can debate endlessly about the term "substantial
evidence"; they have done so in the federal system. 469 Ohio can expect the same
debate in the context of labor relations. 47" A great deal is at stake for employers,
unions, and the SERB alike, in this definition.
464. 1983 Ohio Laws 140, § 7.
465. Id. The purpose of the Public Employment Advisory and Counseling Effort Commission is to ease the
transition into the new legislation's enforcement.
466. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.02(M).
467. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
468. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.02(M) interacts with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.03(H) (Page Supp. 1983). OHIO
REV. CODE § 4117.02(H)(8) allows rules to be adopted, but they may be modified as provided in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
119.03 (Page Supp. 1983).
469. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185 (1974); Jaffe, Judicial Review:
"'Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record," 64 HARV. L. REV. 1233 (1951); B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 100, § 210, at
591-95 (1976); 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6:8 (2d ed. 1978).
470. Ohio already had substantial evidence as its standard of rulemaking review. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 119.12 (Page Supp. 1983). Considerably more judicial construction can be expected for the term "substantial evi-
dence" if projections about litigation against the SERB come true.
[Vol. 44:891
19831 OHIO PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 939
Apart from a few exceptional cases of review for arbitrariness, such as the
review of union dues rebates47 1 and the nonreviewable unit decisions, 472 virtually the
whole universe of SERB action is dependent upon a court's finding of substantial
evidence for the SERB decision. The Attorney General, who is the SERB's litigation
attorney under the 1983 House amendments, 473 may try to short-cut the debate over
this critical term by issuing a formal opinion that will try to define "substantiality" in
the abstract. 4
74
The SERB may try to define the quantum of substantial evidence for its own
adjudicatory purposes. Such a rule must be written to describe the substantial evi-
dence required prior to certification.475 The SERB may get some deference for its
view, as may the Attorney General. More likely, however, the courts will wrestle
with each case, and each jurist will add his or her contribution to the precedential
evolution of authority on the term.
From the federal precedents it can be predicted that substantial evidence review
standards will demand more from the SERB record than the slightly more deferential
arbitrary and capricious standard of review. Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla but less than a preponderance. 476 It is comparable to the civil standard of
"enough [evidence] to justify ... a refusal to direct a verdict' ;477 and it is "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a con-
clusion." 478 These and the Ohio precedents will form the basis for most of the review
of cases arising under the new law.
Overall, the substantial evidence standard imposes greater scrutiny than the
agency would receive under an arbitrariness review test, but it is not a guarantee of
thoughtful review from every court. Those courts willing to read the record carefully
and take account of administrative errors can use the substantial evidence standard as
a tool to improve administrative determinations under the new law.4 79 Rebuttal evi-
dence and contradictions must be examined fully;480 but courts that wish to reverse
the outcome can also use this standard, with the inherent subjectivity of an "in-
sufficient substantiality" judgment.4 8'
471. Omo REV. CODE § 4117.09(C).
472. Id. § 4117.06(A).
473. Id. § 4117.02(E).
474. The Attorney General may issue opinions at the request of state agencies and officers. Onto REv. CODE ANN.
§ 109.12 (Page 1978); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 670 (1939). For the federal system, with long established expert agencies,
"while courts are at pains to take into account the agency's experienced and informed reading of statutes, courts speak
with some comfort and an authority of their own on such issues." Panel, Managing the Regulatory Process, 32 AD. L.
REv. 239, 245 (1980) (Remarks of Judge Carl McGowan).
475. Onto REv. CODE § 4117.05(A)(2).
476. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620
(1966); ICC v. Northern Pac. R.R., 222 U.S. 541, 548 (1912).
477. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939).
478. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
479. A close examination of the record in an unfair labor practice case illustrates how the substantiality test can be
applied by an active reviewing court; see, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); NLRB v. Milgo
Indus., 567 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1977).
480. "The substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight."
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
481. Under the federal standard, recent case law has tended to meld the concepts of insubstantiality of evidence and
arbitrariness of the decision. See, e.g., Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:891
One major set of actions is not reviewable under substantial evidence and is not
really SERB action at all-the arbitration and conciliation review. A specially tai-
lored standard of review for commercial arbitration has existed for years in Ohio
law. 482 That standard is not well tailored for labor relations in the public sector, but it
was included as the review standard for final offer settlement proceedings. 48 3 Jury
determinations 484 and the special review criteria that the arbitration statutes bring into
the new collective bargaining law4 85 may create great difficulty for courts, and
particularly for labor.
The substantial evidence test can be compared with the other standards of review
in hypothetical cases. A conciliator who studies a county's ability to pay a nine
percent raise demanded by the union will probably have substantial evidence in the
documents to justify the award. This support would be sufficient to uphold a normal
decision if made by the SERB itself.486 But the county will win on a motion to vacate
the arbitration award if it can show, inter alia, that the conciliator exceeded his or her
powers, "or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award
upon the subject matter submitted was not made."-487 Poor methods of financial
analysis may constitute imperfect executions of the duty to consider a relevant statu-
tory factor, such as the ability of the county to pay the raises. 488 This will be a
problematical area of case law development.
342, 350 (2d Cir. 1973). The application of this mixed standard of review in a rulemaking setting is difficult for the
agency, for the reviewing court can invalidate federal agency rules if they are based on factors that the legislature did not
intend for the agency to consider, or if the agency's explanation runs contrary to the evidence; both are situations that the
SERB may experience in judicial review of its early determinations if it chooses to proceed with policies set by
rulemaking. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856
(1983).
482. Onto REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2711.10-.11 (Page 1981).
483. OHtO REV. CODE § 4117.14(H).
484. A jury determines whether a party is at fault for refusing to arbitrate an issue. For example, assume a
disagreement about a management rights question, which the union takes to final offer settlement over the employer's
objection. The conciliator awards the union its desired outcome. On appeal, the employer's refusal to arbitrate is the
functional equivalent of breach of an agreement to arbitrate, which breach is subject to jury trial under § 2711.03 of the
Revised Code. Part of the weakness of applying chapter 2711 is that no "written agreement for arbitration" in the
commercial sense exists if the parties are silent in their labor contract regarding the final offer settlement procedure.
Because the conciliator operates whether or not there is a written contract term referring to final offer settlement, and
because the statutory section that mandates the content of collective bargaining contracts, Onto REv. CODE § 4117.09, is
silent regarding final offer settlements, there may be instances in which omission of the final offer procedure from the
contract allows the union to avoid a jury trial because of the consequent inapplicability of the "written agreement" term of
§ 2711.03. Inevitably, the two sides will litigate this issue.
485. Criteria for the court to apply, on a motion to vacate an award, include: (A) fraud or "undue means"; (B)
evident partiality on the part of the arbitrator(s), perhaps including collusion among ostensibly neutral members of a
conciliation panel (see Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Fennie, 55 A.D.2d 1007, 391 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1977)); (C) misconduct or
misbehavior of arbitrators "by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced," which may include the determinative
consideration of evidence that gives one side too great an advantage (see, e.g., Voigt v. Bowen, 53 A.D.2d 277, 385
N.Y.S.2d 600 (1976)); or (D) a finding that the arbitrators exceeded their powers "or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.10
(Page 1981).
486. This documentation, if it could be assembled in time to be used, would be most helpful for the union. It would
supply substantial evidence, for example, in an unfair labor practice refusal to bargain case under Otto REV. CODE
§ 4117.13(B). There will be some evidence in support of the raise because the union will file a supporting rationale
statement with its final offer. Id. § 4117.14(G)(3). An arbitrator's simple misconstruction of the facts by accepting one
side's rationale does not invalidate an arbitration award. See Springfield v. Walker, 42 Ohio St. 543 (1885).
487. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.I0(D) (Page 1981).
488. This level of ambiguity in a provision of such great operative significance may be the Achilles' heel of the
binding arbitration system, for it will be debated extensively in light of public concern over increasing taxes to fund final
offer settlements. It is not enough that the reviewing court merely disagrees with the finding of fact made in a private
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Was it a mistake for the legislation to apply commercial arbitration review
principles to the different needs of public employee arbitration? Some will argue that
it was; others can argue that, as a policy matter, the review of final offer settlement
orders would be inadequate, and the public interest not sufficiently balanced if sub-
stantial evidence review were used.489 Contract agreements other than final offer
conciliator orders still can be enforced under normal contract law principles if the
parties choose to litigate.4 90
Three innovations in the law have special judicial review aspects. First, as
discussed above, unit determinations are expressly nonreviewable in state courts. The
potential exists for a due process claim in special circumstances, which could be
brought in a federal court as a constitutional challenge to state action. An example
may be police sergeants, whom the bill excludes from units of lower-ranking police
officers. The unit determination that is statutorily barred from review could be an
infringement of associational rights. A federal court may be reluctant to join the fray,
even though it has the power to decide the constitutional question.
4 91
Second, strike injunctions cannot be issued by the court without prior agreement
of the administrative body, the SERB .492 This divestiture of jurisdiction pending
administrative decision is rare for the courts.493
Third, the SERB can file a sua sponte review petition appealing its own final
orders.4 94 The former versions of the bill allowed the SERB to certify questions to the
Ohio Supreme Court. 4 9 5 That created some doubt about the usual need for a case or
controversy before a matter became subject to appellate judicial determination.49 6
During the 1983 deliberations, the provision was greatly modified so that the SERB
must first reach a final decision, issue an order, and then file a petition for review in
one of the courts of appeals. 497 The SERB direct appeal action was expressly per-
mitted, and standing and jurisdiction were granted by the Act. It remains to be seen
whether a conflict among the courts of appeals will develop on the same issue.4 98
arbitration, for that would undo the private bargain from which the arbitration came, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Local Union No. 200, 42 Ohio St. 2d 516, 520, 330 N.E.2d 703, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986 (1975), but the reviewing
courts may take a different tack when the parties do not acquiesce to arbitration but have it imposed upon them by the
legislative body at the state level. See, e.g., Newark Teachers Ass'n v. Newark City Bd. of Educ., 444 F. Supp. 1283
(S.D. Ohio 1978).
489. The issues are of such grave importance to the general population of taxpayers, employees, and recipients of
essential services, that it can be asserted that the "more than a scintilla" standard of substantial evidence is not a sufficient
measure for review of an arbitration award.
490. Onto REV. CODE § 4117.11(C).
491. Constitutional claims can still be brought in federal courts under federal statutes, notwithstanding the state
statute, if the normal procedural prerequisites to federal action are satisfied. See, e.g., Newark Teachers Ass'n v. Newark
City Bd. of Educ., 444 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D. Ohio 1978).
492. Onto REV. CODE § 4117.16(A).
493. See supra text accompanying note 339.
494. Onto REV. CODE § 4117.02(L).
495. See Sub. S.B. 222, 112th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. (1977) (proposed § 4117.02(L)). Cf. the dormant provision
for Supreme Court review in Onto Rm,. CODE ANN. § 4141.28(N) (Page 1980).
496. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
497. Onto REV. CODE § 4117.02(L). The term "decision" was changed to "final order" by a House floor
amendment. In the House committee an amendment eliminated the usual review jurisdiction of the court of common pleas
for Franklin County over administrative final orders, OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Page Supp. 1983), and replaced it
with the court of appeals for the area where the public employer is situated. The jurisdiction of the court of appeals is
limited to situations in which the SERB certifies the issue as being of great public interest. All other orders are appealed to
the court of common pleas. Onto REV. CODE § 4117.02(L).
498. By eschewing central appellate review under § 119.12 of the Revised Code, the House committee amendment
opened up potential conflict among the courts of appeals. The SERB will use this power onlyin exceptional cases, and
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Conflicting positions would embarrass an agency that asked courts for advice and
then desired to reject the advice given. On that issue at least, the agency as appellant
may be collaterally estopped from relitigating and may be limited to the answer it
receives. 499
The semiadvisory appeal process also endangers the precedential value of a
party's favorable decision, since the "judge" can appeal its own decision though the
litigants choose not to do so. 5° ° The provision's proponents modeled this section on
other states' opinion systems, and they expected it would speed decisions in the
courts and lend early credibility to SERB decisions. This may happen, but the
provision may ultimately be used infrequently by the SERB.
XI. CONCLUSION
No legislation can be perfect, and none of the sponsors claimed that the 1983
Ohio public employee collective bargaining law was perfect. The benefits of catching
up to other states, most of which were ahead of Ohio on collective bargaining for
public workers, appear to exceed the costs of the imperfections in the Ohio law. The
extent of the benefit to the employee organizations will be known when representa-
tion elections are completed in 1984-85; and whether the benefit in the form of
peaceful labor relations is realized will be known after a trial period of perhaps four
years.
The costs of the new law are the biggest unknown, and the study commission's
supervision of the process will be a good source of data on its additional costs.
Students of the legislative process will watch the number and approach of the amend-
ments that the new law inevitably will spawn in the legislature.
Under the new law, courts of equity will have narrower authority in some cases,
while as reviewers of agency action they will have wider, record-reviewing authority
in the new labor review settings. Local officials, particularly legislators, will face a
frustrating adjustment period. Negotiators for both local and state government will
have to carry the onus of rapidly learning to live with the SERB. Their comments and
feedback can shape the agency's rules and policies. Last, but not least, the Ohio
public employee, who waited two decades for this law, will be richer in wages,
poorer in payroll deductions, but generally happier with the brave new world of Ohio
collective bargaining.
presumably the Attorney General in representing the SERB will act as the United States Solicitor General does, to screen
out less important appeals so as to reduce the prospect of damaging precedents. Because it would be prudent for the
Attorney General to avoid disputes between the courts of appeals instigated by the SERB itself, only rarely should the
same question be asked by the Board of two different courts.
499. Because the moving party is the Board itself, the likelihood that collateral estoppel will bar relitigation of the
same legal issue is great. For that reason, the Board must start winning its cases early, or it may be in a difficult tactical
position because of adverse precedents.
500. The final order by the SERB involves actual parties before the Board, but its ability to appeal to the court of
appeals and later to the supreme court is independent of the real parties in interest. Because this is a statutory remedy for
the Board, it may be difficult for the actual employer and employee parties to claim mootness.
[Vol. 44:891
